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Almost every serious commentator to address the moral and legal
question of torture has taken for granted the proposition that the
infliction of torture is a sufficiently grave evil to require a distinctly
demanding moral scrutiny, one that categorically sets torture apart
from other terrible things (including killing) that human beings do to
one another. To borrow from the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence, most people agree that torture is "different. "
Under the Eighth Amendment, the fact that death is different does
not rule out its application; it simply alters the relevant procedural and
substantive standards. By contrast, many scholars believe torture
should be entirely out of the question, and positive law gives effect to
this view. This Article asks why. Why does torture merit its own moral
category when killing does not?
The Article asks first whether torture is in fact "different" at all.
To this end, the Article sets out a novel hypothetical case in which a
torturer acts in true self-defense. It thereby demonstrates that when
circumstances are truly identical, and the "self-defense"
characterization is accurate, the use of torture becomes no more
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troubling than the use of lethalforce.
The Article then turns to the "ticking bomb" scenario and asks
what makes this case different enough from genuine self-defense to
engender such division among those who support the right to justifiable
homicide. Having demonstrated that the difference between torture and
killing fails to account for the distinction, the Article develops a series
of hypothetical examples that produce three criteria that will justify the
use of torture and/or lethal force: First, torture or killing must be used
against a wrongdoer; second, the force must be an effective means of
saving innocents; and third, the status of the person to be killed or
tortured as a wrongdoer must be closely tied to the utility of selecting
him. It cannot, in other words, be a coincidence that the person whose
torture will save lives also happens to be a wrongdoer.
Unlike other work on the subject of torture, this Article does not
attempt to persuade the reader of the legality, illegality, morality, or
immorality of torture under particular circumstances. Instead, it
attempts to explain the nature of the debate and shed light on its evident
intractability. The Article concludes that disagreements over the
morality of torture are likely to persist because one can make a
reasonably persuasive case both for and against the satisfaction of the
third criterion I unearth-the tightness of fit between a subject's
wrongdoing and the utility of torturing him-in the case of the "ticking
bomb" case.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether torture is ever justifiable is, to put it mildly, controversial.
In the age of global terrorism, one can easily imagine scenarios in which
torture could mean the difference between life and death for innocent
civilians. Numerous scholars have weighed in on this issue, and those
who disagree with one another often have difficulty remaining civil in
their discourse.'
Nonetheless, a common assumption underlies virtually everything
that moral theorists say on the subject-the assumption that "torture is
different." Nearly everyone assumes that unlike other things that people
do to one another (including killing each other in ways that
knowingly-though not deliberately-cause the same sorts of
excruciating pain as torture does), torture demands a different form of
analysis. While there are pacifists,2 who oppose all violence, many
absolute opponents of torture-such as Amnesty International-are not
I E.g., Desmond Manderson, Another Modest Proposal, 10 DEAKIN L. REV. 640, 651-52
(2005) ("Torture is wrong under all circumstances, not because it leads to certain bad outcomes,
but for no reason: simply and inherently.... In fact, to look for reasons... is a sign of
psychopathy."); Anne O'Rourke, Vivek Chaudhri & Chris Nyland, Torture, Slippery Slopes,
Intellectual Apologists, and Ticking Bombs: An Australian Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40
U.S.F. L. REv. 85, 101 (2005) ("The paucity of academic rigor in [Bagaric and Clarke's]
reasoning is disappointing."); Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION 257, 265 (Sandford Levinson ed., 2004) [hereinafter TORTURE: A COLLECTION]
("Instead of engaging me in a nuanced debate.., critics of my proposal have accused me of
'circumventing constitutional prohibitions on torture,' giving 'thumbs up to torture,' 'proposing
torture for captured terrorist leaders,' ... and 'advocating... shoving a sterilized needle under
the fingernails of... subjects being interrogated."'); Heather MacDonald, How to Interrogate
Terrorists, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 84, 96 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006)
[hereinafter TORTURE DEBATE] ("Human Rights Watch, the ICRC, Amnesty International, and
the other self-professed guardians of humanitarianism need to come back to earth, to the real
world in which torture means what the Nazis and the Japanese did in their concentration and
POW camps in World War II; the world in which evil regimes, like those we fought in
Afghanistan and Iraq, don't follow the Miranda rules or the Convention Against Torture ... ").
2 See, e.g., DONALD WETZEL, PACIFIST: OR, MY WAR AND LOUS LEPKE (1986); THOMAS
TRZYNA & RICHARD A. KAUFFMAN, BLESSED ARE THE PACIFISTS: THE BEATITUDES AND THE
JUST WAR THEORY (2006).
2009] 1413
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pacifists.3 Yet there seems to be a broad consensus that torture is
different and that distinct rules ought to apply (whether those rules
contemplate an absolute prohibition or an almost-absolute rule with a
very limited exception for the threat of catastrophe). 4
The "torture is different" view resembles the U.S. Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment approach to capital punishment, which holds that
"death is different." This approach has come to mean that trial
procedures which are constitutionally adequate in the case of a person
threatened with prison become violations of the ban on "cruel and
unusual punishments" when they might result in a death sentence. The
defendant in a capital case has the right to insist, for example, that the
jury be informed-if it is true-that "life imprisonment" does not allow
for the possibility of parole.5 In addition, the proportionality principle
of the Eighth Amendment-which is said to require that the punishment
fit the crime-does not appear to have much application outside the
capital context, though the Court is quite vigilant about proportionality
when the penalty is death. 6 Because the stakes are so high, because the
proposed action is so extreme, the logic goes, we must be exceedingly
3 See Seven Questions: A Walk on the Dark Side, FOREIGN POLICY, May 2007,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?storyjd=3841 ("Amnesty is not a pacifist
organization, and we do not take a position on military conflicts per se."); Mitch Nauffts, Ken
Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch: Human Rights in An Age of Terror,
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIGEST, June 16, 2003, http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/
newsmakers/nwsmkr.jhtml?id=36500031 ("Human Rights Watch is not a pacifist organization.");
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, U.S. TORTURE AND ABUSE OF DETAINEES,
https://199.173.149.140/campaigns/torture.htm ("Torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
practices should be as unthinkable as slavery."); see also Michael Walzer, Political Action: The
Problem of Dirty Hands, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 61, 65 ("Augustine did
not believe that it was wrong to kill in a just war; i, was just sad, or the sort of thing a good man
would be saddened by. But he might have thought it wrong to torture in a just war, and later
Catholic theorists have certainly thought it wrong."); U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs .... "). By regulating the conduct of war, moreover, the Geneva Conventions
(which explicitly prohibit torture) implicitly recognize the potential legitimacy of a just war.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
4 By proposing that the ban on torture is an "archetype," Jeremy Waldron, for instance,
apparently agrees that torture is qualitatively distinct from other practices, for which exceptions
may be permissible. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White
House, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1681, 1687 (2005).
5 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); see generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 167 (1976) (espousing the view that "death is different" and holding that rules that have
no application in ordinary criminal trials do apply in capital cases.).
6 Compare Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (invalidating death penalty for
rape of a child), and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (invalidating death penalty for rape
of an adult woman), with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding life sentence for
possession of 672 grams of cocaine), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (allowing life
imprisonment for passing a bad check), and Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding
long sentence (25 to life) for committing three minor property felonies, under a Three Strikes
law).
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careful to ensure that whatever justification we propose truly is present,
or, alternatively, we must prohibit the practice altogether, no matter
what the circumstances are.
"Torture is different," of course, goes well beyond "death is
different." For one thing, in the United States, capital punishment is not
absolutely prohibited. Though the required procedures can be
demanding, the government may lawfully execute at least some of the
people convicted of crimes in this country. Torture, defined as the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,7 on the other hand, is
never permissible as a punishment under U.S. law. This means, first,
that although the government may kill people, it may not use
excruciatingly painful methods to do so.8 And second, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits use of such punishments as the rack and the
screw for convicts, even if they will live to tell about it.9 Torture,
accordingly, occupies an absolute status within American criminal law
(and under international norms) that death-though "different"--does
not similarly occupy.
Prohibitions against torture, moreover, extend to wartime and
therefore necessarily contemplate a world in which people are
permissibly killing one another, even when they know that some who
die will be innocent non-combatants.' 0 The civilized world therefore
places torture beyond death in the hierarchy of prohibited acts.
This Article explores what makes torture "different." This
includes, in part, a consideration of what it differs from. That is, when
we say "death is different," we mean that it is different, both
7 See U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. I G.A. res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcat39.htm
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture] ("For the purposes of this Convention, the term
'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions."). For an explanation of why I adopt the definition of torture that I do, see
infra Part I.B.
8 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("'[T]he unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.., constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment."'); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (explaining that the following punishments would violate the Eighth
Amendment: drawing and dragging a prisoner to the place of execution; disemboweling a
prisoner alive and beheading him; publicly dissecting a prisoner; and burning him alive).
9 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (tying a prisoner to a hitching post as part of
his punishment violated the Eighth Amendment); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
10 See John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad, in
TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 145, 149.
20091 1415
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procedurally and substantively, from other forms of permissible
punishment in the United States, such as fines and imprisonment. But
what do we mean when we say that torture is different? And what
accounts for that difference? I consider various possibilities-mostly
through thought experiments-and conclude that existing analyses of
what makes it different do not adequately explain that difference.
To show that torture is not inherently objectionable under all
circumstances, I pose a hypothetical example about an assailant who
unjustifiably attempts to kill a victim. I demonstrate that if the victim of
such an attempted murder can torture rather than kill her attacker to
make him stop his lethal attack, she is unambiguously justified in doing
so, as a matter of self-defense. Whatever it is that makes torture
morally or legally "different," then, must turn on the circumstances that
trigger its use rather than on the simple fact that one is using torture.
Through examples of justified and unjustified killing, I identify
three requirements that must accompany the defensible use of torture.
First, the person to be tortured must be a wrongdoer. Second, torture
must be used to save lives. And third, there must be a close connection
between the identity of the tortured party as a wrongdoer and the utility
of the act of torture in saving lives. As we will see, this connection is
tightest in the case of true self-defense.
Following this introduction, Part I surveys the existing range of
views regarding the morality of torture and then describes my
methodology for entering the discussion. Part II compares torture to
killing and demonstrates through a novel hypothetical example that a
person who utilizes torture in true self-defense is morally no different
from a person who kills in true self-defense. The Part goes on to
identify how interrogational torture-even in extreme circumstances in
which a terrorist refuses to disclose life-saving information about a
bomb he has planted-is distinct from true self-defense. It does so by
comparing two cases of killing to save a life, one of which qualifies as
self-defense and the other of which does not. It proposes that justifiable
torture (or killing) carries the three requirements introduced above, each
of which self-defense torture (or killing) meets but interrogational
torture may or may not meet, depending on how demanding one is
about the third requirement. It is because such torture does not clearly
meet (but also does not clearly fail to meet) the third requirement, I
argue, that disagreements about this question are intractable. Part III
explores the moral complexity of interrogational torture within the
three-requirement framework. The next two Parts (IV and V) discuss
two cases (one from real life and one from literature) that demonstrate
why one might ban all torture despite its rare justifiability but why the
question is not an easy one to answer.
1416 [Vol. 30:4
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I. ENTERING THE TORTURE DEBATE
A. Torture in Context: The Moral Terrain
This Part summarizes and briefly analyzes existing debate on the
question of torture. My aim in surveying the range of views on this
subject is thereby to identify precisely what the hard questions are and
how we might best go about attempting to answer them.
When we debate the legitimacy of torture, the scope of argument is
relatively narrow. Moral theorists tend to agree that nearly all instances
of torture known to humankind are unjustifiable. Such instances
include the conduct of the Spanish and Portugese Inquisitions," the
Nazis during the second World War, 12 the French in Algeria, 13 official
acts during Argentina's dirty war,14  and the more recent,
photographically documented, behavior of American soldiers at Abu
Ghraib, 15 along with what is generally thought to be routine conduct in
regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Morocco, to which the U.S.
has been accused of sending terrorist suspects in a practice known as
"extraordinary rendition."' 16
Some of the strongest defenders of justifiable torture agree with its
absolute opponents that most examples of torture-motivated by hatred,
sadism, the desire for incriminating evidence, and a search for
preventative information on a flimsy foundation-are indefensible. 17
11 See generally JOSEPH PtREZ, THE SPANISH INQUISITION: A HISTORY (Janet Lloyd
trans.,Yale Univ. Press 2006) (2002).
12 See generally VIVIEN SPITZ, DOCTORS FROM HELL: THE HORRIFIC ACCOUNT OF NAZI
EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS (2005).
13 See generally RITA MARAN, TORTURE: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE FRENCH-
ALGERIAN WAR (1989); ALISTAIR HORNE, A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954-1962
(2006).
14 See generally MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA AND THE
LEGACIES OF TORTURE (1998).
15 See generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE
WAR ON TERROR (2004).
16 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under
International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309, 314 (2006) ("According to media reports,
suspects are blindfolded, shackled and sedated before being transported by jet to the destination
country where they are typically detained, interrogated, often tortured and sometimes killed. The
most common destination is apparently Egypt, although renditions have occurred involving
Jordan, Syria, Morocco and Uzbekistan, as well.").
17 See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The
Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 581 (2005) [hereinafter
Bagaric & Clarke I]; Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, The Torture Debate: Tortured Responses (A
Reply to Our Critics): Physically Persuading Suspects Is Morally Preferable to Allowing the
Innocent to Be Murdered, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 703, 704 (2006) [hereinafter Bagaric & Clarke II]
("We condone torture only in the lifesaving circumstances .... To our knowledge, no incidents
of torture that have been committed would fall within our criteria.").
20091 1417
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1417 2008-2009
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
Even an unapologetic proponent of its permissibility under limited
circumstances, describes torture as "monstrous."' 18
Notwithstanding such wide consensus, the disagreements-though
narrow-generate heated and angry debate. Roughly organized, one
camp believes that torture is always and necessarily wrong.' 9 The duty
to refrain from torture is absolute, on this approach, and may not bend,
no matter how strong (or, as one commentator puts it, how
"tempting") 20 the interests on the other side. This is also the position of
existing law, including the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment,21 to which
the United States is a signatory. It is, as well, the view of such NGOs as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. 22 Even when faced
with tragic hypothetical examples, their response is unconditional: no
torture, ever.23
In the other camp (which is itself composed of differing
perspectives), people share the view that torture might be justifiable on
rare occasions. Members of this camp are willing to entertain, as a
thought experiment, the so-called "ticking bomb" scenario-a
hypothetical case in which authorities have in custody a terrorist who
has set a bomb that will imminently explode and kill many people
unless the captors torture the terrorist into revealing where the bomb is,
thereby saving the lives that would otherwise have been lost. Members
of the second camp find themselves unwilling to say no to torture under
the hypothesized circumstances. 24 In their view, faced with the prospect
of the deaths of thousands of innocent lives, we may-and, by some
accounts, must-torture the terrorist to save the civilians.
Though they share this impulse about the ticking bomb case,
18 Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture: It's Time to be Honest About Doing
Terrible Things, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 5, 2005, at 24 ("[T]here is no denying the monstrous
evil that is any form of torture. And there is no denying how corrupting it can be to the
individuals and society that practice it.").
19 See Waldron, supra note 4, at 1714-15 ("Might we be willing to allow the authorization of
torture at least in a 'ticking bomb' case... ? [M]y own answer to this question is a simple
'No."'); see also Ariel Dorfnan, The Tyranny of Terror: Is Torture Inevitable in Our Century
and Beyond?, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 3 (voicing absolute opposition to
torture under any and all circumstances); Andrew Sullivan, The Abolition of Torture, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 2005, at 19 (same).
20 See Waldron, supra note 4, at 1686.
21 Convention Against Torture, supra note 7; see also Implementation of the Convention
Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (1999).
22 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3 ("Torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
practices should be as unthinkable as slavery.").
23 Dorfman, supra note 19, at 17. ("I can only pray that humanity will have the courage to
say no, no to torture, no to torture under any circumstances whatsoever .... ").
24 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne et al., Panel Discussion: Torture: The Road to Abu Ghraib and
Beyond, in TORTURE DEBATE, supra note 1, at 13, 21 ("If I actually believed.., that somebody
who was a prisoner under my control knew where there were weapons of mass destruction...
that were going to be used shortly, I might change my view.").
1418 [Vol. 30:4
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members of the second camp divide on the question of how that impulse
should affect the legal status of torture. To prevent unjustified torture,
some theorists who accept that torture is justified in the ticking bomb
case nonetheless say that the law must categorically ban it.25
Furthermore, once a justifiable act of torture occurs, those who support
a ban divide on what the consequences for the torturer ought to be. On
one view, the torturer must accept his punishment, as all brave
practitioners of civil disobedience do as the price for justifiably
violating the law under extreme circumstances. 26  A competing
approach supports a torturer's access to a common law criminal defense
such as necessity or self-defense. 27 And of those who find the ticking
bomb scenario a compelling basis for torture, some would allow the law
to reflect the justification directly. They might, for example, support a
pre-ordained authorization or immunity from prosecution, such as the
torture warrants advocated by Alan Dershowitz. 28 Still others not only
view torture as justified in a variety of circumstances but understand the
prohibitions against torture to apply very narrowly or not at all in the
interrogational context.29 The last of these approaches might fairly be
characterized as demonstrating far less hostility to torture than all of the
others do (and therefore, perhaps, as falling outside the categories I have
identified of those who basically agree that torture is virtually always
wrong).
Intriguingly, Alan Dershowitz refuses to say unequivocally that
25 Sanford Levinson, Contemplating Torture: An Introduction, 23-42, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 23, 30; see also Richard Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and
Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 291-99.
26 See Oren Gross, The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 229, 240.
27 See Parry, supra note 10, at 158 ("If torture provides the last remaining chance to save
lives in imminent peril, the necessity defense should be available .... "); Michael S. Moore,
Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REv. 280, 343 (1989) (setting forth same
proposition); see also Kai Ambos, May a State Torture Suspects to Save the Life of Innocents?, 6
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 261 (2008) (setting forth same proposition).
28 Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 257 (proposing torture warrants to force higher-level officials
to control a practice that we know will take place).
29 For the argument that President-ordered torture is constitutionally protected from legal
prohibition, pursuant to the Commander-in-Chiefs authority to conduct the War on Terror, see
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in TORTURE DEBATE, supra note 1, at 317, 328 [hereinafter Bybee
Memo] ("In short, reading the definition of torture as a whole, it is plain that the term
encompasses only extreme acts."); id. at 344 ("Any effort to apply Section 2340A in a manner
that interferes with the President's direction of such core war matters as the detention and
interrogation of enemy combatants... would be unconstitutional."); id. at 351 (proposing
justification defenses for interrogational torture); see also Memorandum from Daniel Levin,
Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to James B. Comney, Deputy Attorney
Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm [hereinafter Levin Memo] (disagreeing with
Bybee Memo's conclusions).
14192009]
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there are cases in which torture would be justified, though he claims that
as a normative matter, he would like to see torture minimized or
eliminated.30 He is therefore the only major theorist who might actually
fall into the first camp (of those who believe that torture is always
wrong, no matter what the circumstances might be), while at the same
time proposing a legal approach that explicitly tolerates some torture
and does so both officially and ex ante (thus insulating the torturer from
later prosecution). Perhaps it is the inherent tension between suggesting
that something is categorically wrong, on the one hand, and proposing
that it should nonetheless be officially sanctioned, on the other, that
accounts for the strongly negative reception that Dershowitz's ideas
have received in both the scholarly and general literature.3' It makes
him an easy target for those, like William Shulz, who ask rhetorically
whether Dershowitz would favor warrants authorizing official perjury,
police brutality, and prison rape as well.3 2
In addition to classifying commentators on their bottom-line
assessment of torture and its proper legal status, we can also divide
them along philosophical lines. There are those who concern
themselves with maximizing collective wellbeing (utilitarians) and
those who believe that some moral principles are important enough to
trump even horrible consequences (deontologists) on both sides of the
torture debate.
Deontologists who favor the absolutist position say that human
dignity prohibits the torture of a single person, guilty or innocent, no
matter what that torture could prevent-even if millions of innocent
people could themselves be saved from torture or murder through that
single act of torture. 33 As Dostoevsky's character Alyosha Karamazov
says, in answer to a question from his brother Ivan, the torture of just
one child would be unjustified even if it would bring everlasting joy to
the rest of the world.34
30 See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 266 ("I am against torture as a normative matter, and
I would like to see its use minimized." (emphasis in original)).
31 See Waldron, supra note 4, at 1686-87 ("[O]ur primary objection to torture ought to be...
for the potential victims of the treatment that ... Dershowitz ... appear[s] to condone."); see
Richard Posner, The Best Offense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28 ("But it is typical of
Dershowitz's lack of restraint that.., he [reveals his preferred method of torture]." (reviewing
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO
THE CHALLENGE (2002)). Perhaps in part because of such negative assessments, Dershowitz has
recently written a book that is far more critical of torture, even as a matter of constitutional law,
than he had previously been. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, Is THERE A RIGHT To REMAIN
SILENT?: COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11 (2008).
32 William F. Shulz, The Torturer's Apprentice: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age, THE
NATION, May 13, 2003 ("Why ought the police not be able, therefore, to apply for 'brutality
warrants[,]'... "'testilying" warrants[,]'. . . [and] 'warrants to tolerate prisoner rape'... ?").
33 See Waldron, supra note 4, at 1687, 1713; see also Dorfman, supra note 19.
34 See Dorfman, supra note 19, at 15 ("'I challenge you-answer. Imagine that you are
creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them
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Utilitarian anti-torture absolutists believe that the net benefit of an
absolute ban outweighs the net benefit of a ban with an exception,
however narrowly crafted.35 Though one could, in theory, present a
hypothetical case in which this would not be true, the utilitarian
absolutist believes we are ill-equipped to identify this scenario with
sufficient precision to justify the consequences of "cross[ing] that ...
Rubicon" and authorizing torture.36 In that sense, the absolutist could
be described as a "rule" utilitarian, concerned with creating a rule that
will lead to the best consequences overall, even if a more nuanced
approach might-in theory-have better consequences in a particular
case.
There are, conversely, deontologists, such as Michael Moore, who
believe that torture is not only acceptable but morally compulsory under
some circumstances because consequences can be grave enough to
override even a strong moral principle such as that against torture.
37
Moore argues that we have a moral duty to intervene to prevent
atrocities from occurring and that the terrorist who threatens thousands
triggers that duty, even if it requires the Good Samaritan to commit an
act of torture. 38 (Moore concludes, however, that a necessity defense,
rather than a pre-authorization or immunity for torture, would be the
appropriate vehicle for acknowledging this justification.)
And, too, there are utilitarians who believe that if torture results in
the net saving of lives, it is at least sometimes morally permissible, and
ought accordingly to be legally permissible (with the implicit
assumption that torture could, in some instances, have such a result).39
Most people outside the academy (and even within it, I would
surmise) are hybrids. To make the notion of a hybrid concrete, consider
a hypothetical person, Q. Q believes that one could justifiably torture a
peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny
creature-that little child beating its breast with its fist, for instance-and to found that edifice on
its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?' (quoting
FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV)). As I argue at length in the balance of
this Article, it may or may not be significant that in Ivan Karamazov's example, the torturee is an
innocent (in fact, a baby).
35 Henry Shue, Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 47-75.
36 David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37
GEO. J. INT'L L. 61, 84 (2005).
37 Moore, supra note 27, at 297-98. I thank Robert Ferguson for raising the question whether
Moore is actually taking a consequentialist position here, despite his ordinarily deontological
inclinations. I think Moore would say in response that even if one could torture one person to
save a few people, which-from a consequentialist point of view-would be appropriate, such an
act would be absolutely prohibited. At some point, however, the consequences of inaction alter
the strength of one's moral duty to rescue others. That is, Moore could believe that consequences
play a role in filling out the content of the action/inaction distinction, a distinction that is
ordinarily very important to a deontologist but that perhaps becomes less significant as inaction
tends increasingly toward a horrendous result.
38 Id.
39 See Bagaric & Clarke I, supra note 17, at 608-10.
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terrorist who has set a bomb that will-if the terrorist is not compelled
through torture to reveal its whereabouts-explode in a short time and
kill thousands of people. Q does not, however, believe that one could
justifiably torture the terrorist's baby to induce the terrorist to provide
the very same information. The distinction between the two scenarios is
primarily deontological-though the same number of people will live or
die as a consequence of the decision whether or not to torture in each
instance, the torture target in the second scenario deserves better
treatment than the torture target in the first. I say primarily
deontological because one could reasonably argue that the
consequences of opening the door to the torture of innocents could do
greater damage to the population's wellbeing than would the torture of a
wrongdoer. Still, if we posit that no one will discover what happened,
Q may believe that consequences notwithstanding, torturing the baby is
simply much worse than torturing the guilty terrorist, and therefore
ought to be absolutely prohibited.
For Q, consequences count, even in the face of a contrary moral
principle. The fact that thousands of people would die if the terrorist
were not tortured matters a great deal. If instead, only one person
would die (or perhaps, only one person might die), Q might be
unwilling to authorize torture, even if the person to be tortured is a
terrorist. A hybrid cousin of Q, call him P, might, by contrast to Q,
even be prepared to torture a terrorist's innocent baby if (but only if) the
alternative resulting harm is sufficiently certain and sufficiently
catastrophic.
Because one's own philosophical views invariably color one's
account of all philosophical positions, fairness requires me to disclose
my own approach: I would count myself among the moral hybrids. I
care deeply about the consequences of people's actions, but I also
consider some actions, under some circumstances, sufficiently wrong to
require restraint even when the wrongful means would result in a net
gain.
I generally find absolutes unsatisfying, in part because I believe the
distinction between action and inaction-a distinction on which rests
the ability of the absolutist to claim innocence in the deaths of the un-
tortured terrorist's victims-to be more problematic than many
deontologists would acknowledge. 40 At the same time, I find persuasive
the argument that torture warrants and other official recognition of
torture's occasional legitimacy are likely to result in even more
unjustifiable torture than we already have. I find provisionally
40 But cf John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1977)
(arguing that in situations in which one could save the lives of some subset or another but not all
who need assistance, maximizing the number of people saved is not a sound basis for deciding
how to proceed).
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appealing the notion that anyone who commits an act of torture that she
believes is justified be compelled to take the risk of later punishment if
she turns out to have been wrong.
B. A Note About Methodology and Definition
Before embarking on my examination of how and whether torture
is "different," I wish to explain the methodology that I use as well as the
working definition of torture that I employ. Concerning methodology, I
develop a series of hypothetical examples on the basis of which I
identify moral intuitions that may underlie people's reactions to the
prospect of torture under ethically challenging circumstances. I deploy
these examples to highlight particular features of the conduct in
question that I believe are worthy of discussion. As experimental
sociology has begun to discover, human beings-regardless of
culture-tend to share a variety of moral intuitions, a reality that makes
conversations about morality a productive enterprise. 41 I find such
moral discourse especially helpful because I do not think we can
usefully appeal to any universally accepted text or other primary source
to identify moral truth. Our moral intuitions, when drawn out and
challenged, however, can bring us to a reflective equilibrium.42 And
this is true even if readers disagree with my reactions to a particular
hypothetical example, because, having articulated the competing
concerns through a concrete fact pattern, we can have a conversation
about what ought to matter in calculating the moral status of
interrogational torture. My aim is therefore to identify and distill the
content of a conflict rather than to persuade readers of a particular
position on the morality of torture.
Cass Sunstein has criticized this methodology, arguing that in
consulting their intuitions, people utilize "moral heuristics" that are
41 See Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 36
("When anthropologists like Richard Shweder and Alan Fiske survey moral concerns across the
globe, they find that a few themes keep popping up from amid the diversity. People
everywhere.., think it's bad to harm others and good to help them. They have a sense of
fairness .... They value loyalty to a group .... They believe that it is right to defer to
legitimate authorities .... And they exalt purity, cleanliness, and sanctity .... "); see also MARK
D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: THE NATURE OF RIGHT AND WRONG 44 (2006).
42 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48 (1971) ("From the standpoint of moral
philosophy, the best account of a person's sense ofjustice is not the one which fits his judgments
prior to his examining any conception ofjustice, but rather the one which matches his judgments
in reflective equilibrium. As we have seen, this state is one reached after a person has weighed
various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them
or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception)."). But see Cass
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1583-84 (2004)
(proposing that the dangers of heuristics in factual deliberation could apply as well to reasoning
within the moral domain).
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prone to error in unfamiliar contexts, in the same way as factual
heuristics are.43  "Heuristics" (rules of thumb for quick problem-
solving) in the factual domain include the availability heuristic, in
which people tend to assume (often incorrectly) that whatever factual
explanation most readily comes to mind is correct. Similar to such
rules, Sunstein suggests, are moral heuristics-rules of thumb that
would, in general, provide the "right" answer to a moral question.
Sunstein proposes that moral heuristics can distort our thinking,
especially when we deal-as I do in this paper-with exotic and
stylized hypothetical examples. 44 I tend to disagree with this view.
First, I accept that one cannot simply answer a hypothetical
question off the top of one's head and immediately leap to a broad
moral conclusion. As with factual inquiries, however, immediate
impulses can be modified and adjusted through a process of comparison
and identification of principles and relevant distinctions. This process,
of formulating "exotic" hypothetical examples and then articulating my
own responses and fine-tuning them by reference to other examples,
strikes me as very different from the process of blindly following a rule
of thumb, as people are prone to do in the factual heuristics context.
Second, some of the specific examples by which Sunstein attempts
to demonstrate that moral heuristics malfunction in the world of exotic
hypotheticals do not obviously illustrate his point. Notably, he invokes
and discusses two well-known thought experiments involving trolleys,
the first of which hypothesizes that "a runaway trolley is headed for five
people, who will be killed if the trolley continues on its current course.
The question is whether you would throw a switch that would move the
trolley onto another set of tracks, killing one person rather than five."'45
The second contains the same facts, but with one difference: "The only
way to save the five is to throw a stranger, now on a footbridge that
spans the tracks, into the path of the trolley, killing that stranger but
preventing the trolley from reaching the others. '46 Sunstein asserts that
people's nearly universal tendency to classify the trolley cases
differently, depending on whether one is switching tracks or throwing a
person in the way of a train, is obviously misguided, because the same
number of lives are lost (1) and the same number are saved (5) in both
of these examples. 47
43 See Sunstein, supra note 42.
44 See id.
45 Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 780 (2003) (reviewing
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al.
eds., 2002)); see also Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double
Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19 (1978).
46 Sunstein, supra note 45; see also Judith Jarvis Thomson, Comment, The Trolley Problem,
94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1409 (1985).
47 See Sunstein, supra note 45; Sunstein, supra note 42 at 1583-84 ("[T]he underlying
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His conclusion, however, rests on the contested assumption that the
only morally relevant dimension of the scenario is the number of lives
forfeited and the number saved, rather than considering the possibility
that intentionally using a person's live body to stop a train is different
from foreseeably causing a person's death by intentionally diverting a
train away from a larger number of vulnerable people. This-the
purpose/knowledge distinction (or what is also called the
intending/foreseeing distinction 48)-reveals that utilizing a strict
utilitarian principle rather than consulting our moral intuitions may well
mask important features of morally challenging (and perhaps even more
realistic) triage situations.
I now turn to the question of defining torture. The Convention
Against Torture and the implementing federal legislation define it as the
deliberate infliction of severe pain by or at the behest of a government
official. 49 The first question that arises is whether to include in my own
definition the "severity" criterion. I am not committed to a strong
version of this criterion, but I do think that trivial pain--of the sort
accompanying a pinch by an angry sibling-falls outside of any
sensible definition. The precise meaning of torture will be somewhat
hazy at the margins, but I wish to eliminate trivial (but deliberate)
infliction of pain, such as the act of pinching or slapping, from the
definition. I therefore retain the severity criterion, though I certainly
reject the views expressed in the Bybee memo about the meaning of
"severe pain" and do not mean for anything in this Article to support the
conclusion that one must be in the sort of agony that accompanies death
before one can be said to have experienced torture.50
Another feature of defining torture involves the identity of the
actor carrying out the deliberate infliction of pain. International law and
domestic law generally define and prohibit torture by state officials but
heuristic misfires in drawing a distinction between the two cleverly devised cases.").
48 See, e.g., David Enoch, Ends, Means, Side-Effects, and Beyond: A Comment on the
Justification of the Use of Force, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 43, 55-57 (2006); see also David
Enoch, Intending, Foreseeing, and the State, 13 LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2007)).
49 U.N. Convention Against Torture, supra note 7. Notably, the International Criminal Court
("ICC") definition of torture differs from the C.A.T. definition in some significant ways. It reads:
"'Torture' means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions." Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7 § 2(e), July 1, 2002, available at
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/legaltools/download.php?p=LOIuIEJhc2ijIEIDQyBkb2N lbWVudHMvUm9tZSBTdGFOd
XRIICgwMSOwNyOyMDAwKShFKS5wZGY=. Unlike the C.A.T. definition, the ICC definition
does not require governmental action of any kind for behavior to qualify as torture. It does,
however, require custody or control, which the C.A.T. definition does not. The two therefore
overlap, but each encompasses a range of conduct excluded by the other.
50 See, e.g., Bybee Memo, supra note 29, at 328.
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not by private individuals. 5' The law thus treats a "state action"
requirement as an essential component of the definition of torture. In
this Article, I do not treat state action as a necessary condition of
torture. In part, this is because whether or not one is acting in an
official capacity is, to some degree, a legal construction rather than a
pure question of fact. A torturer is always a human being deliberately
inflicting great suffering on another.5 2 When we say in ordinary
conversation that a private murderer "tortured" his victim before killing
him, for example, we are speaking coherently, though there is no state
actor involved.53 And to the extent that one believes official torture is
morally warranted in a limited set of circumstances, one is unlikely to
argue that a private act of torture under the same circumstances would
be unjust. The converse is also true.54
The law may, of course, treat public and private torture differently,
because a state apparatus that recognizes a place for official torture will
have significant institutional consequences. To implement Alan
Dershowitz's "torture warrants" proposal, for example, one would have
to acknowledge and even train "repeat players" in the torture endeavor.
One could therefore believe that an act of torture-under a limited set of
conditions-is just and right, but believe as well that the consequences
of institutionalizing torture and creating a class of torturers are too great
51 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 7; The Implementation of the Convention
Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2007). But see ICC definition of torture, supra note 49,
which includes no state action requirement.
52 In this Article, I deal exclusively with the torture of human beings, although it is widely
understood that a person can torture an animal as well.
53 See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 532 (2006) (discussing, in the context of capital
sentencing, the state's efforts to prove "that the homicide was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind," an aggravating factor weighing in favor of
a death sentence); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 378 (2005) (noting that the jury in a capital
case found, as an aggravating factor, that "the murder was committed by torture"); see also
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2414 (1976) (defining torture as "the
infliction of intense pain.., to punish or coerce someone").
54 Cf Ambos, supra note 27 (discussing the significance of state action in distinguishing
between what the law permits and prohibits, on the one hand, and what an individual may or may
not be blamed for doing, on the other). Kai Ambos concludes that to put this public/private
distinction into effect, he must utilize the conception of "excuse"--so that the individual has
acted wrongfully but nonetheless may not be punished. If one takes the view, however, that
torture is truly just under the circumstances, then, it seems, one has to say that the act is not
"excused" but justified, though it may nonetheless be unlawful.
I wish here to thank my colleague Jens Ohlin for insightfully observing that international
law tends to focus on the ex ante legality of conduct, while criminal law focuses on the ex post
treatment of the individuals who engage in that conduct (which includes a sensitivity to the
particular circumstances that confronted them). Because of this distinction in perspectives, one
might say simultaneously, as the Israeli Supreme Court said, that torture is absolutely prohibited
under the law, that no authorization for torture exists, but that an individual tried for an act of
torture might nonetheless have recourse to a defense. H.C. 5100/94 Public Committee against
Torture in Israel and Others v. The State of Israel, The General Security Services and Other, 53(4)
PD 817 (1999), in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 165, 177 [hereinafter Committee
against Torture v. Israel].
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to countenance. 55
A final point on the definition of torture is that some might argue
there can be no torture without domination. In one sense, domination is
necessarily part of what makes an act torture. If one is in a position to
inflict severe pain on another person for as long as it takes to motivate
an otherwise undesired course of conduct, one must have a degree of
power over the other person. If one is utterly powerless over another, it
follows that one cannot feasibly torture him or her.
In another sense, however, the notion that torture must include
domination-of the sort that a sadist exercises over his prey-is not
obviously accurate. If we assume that torture is wrong, then we might
well view the torturer as necessarily engaging in the exercise of raw
power, but this assumes the conclusion of our inquiry about whether
torture can ever be justified. To determine the answer to this question,
we must be able to assume that the torturer is not on a "power trip" vis-
a-vis the tortured but that his attitude might conceivably be that of
someone who seeks a just outcome and means to cause only as much
harm as is absolutely necessary to save lives threatened by the tortured
party and no more. That is the case of torture about which people
debate.
II. How "DIFFERENT" IS TORTURE?
This Part takes up the central question of the Article: Is torture
truly unique, and if so, why? The first section identifies killing as the
act from which torture might be morally distinct. The following
sections elaborate several examples that illustrate when torture might be
unambiguously justified in true self-defense, when it might instead raise
debatable questions about its legitimacy, and when it would be regarded
by most theorists as unambiguously wrong. Through these examples,
this Part arrives at the conclusion that there are three features of
justifiable torture (shared in common with justifiable killing): the status
55 I have argued, for example, that even if one is not troubled by the death penalty from the
point of view of the condemned and what he deserves-he has committed murder, after all, and
will likely die in much less pain than his victim or victims did--one might still recoil at the death
penalty because it requires human beings to participate in carrying out deliberate acts of killing
unarmed people. See Sherry F. Colb, What Is, And What Is Not, Wrong With the Death Penalty,
FINDLAW, Nov. 22, 2000, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20001122.html. Both because it
effects a change in the torturer and because it affects the public (by exposing the population to
such a changed person), one could well favor a ban on official torture even if one views the
ticking bomb scenario as one in which torture (by an official or by a private individual) is
justifiable. In this Article, however, my main concern is analyzing why, putting aside the impact
on the torturer of being a torturer, people have such distinctive reactions to torture by comparison
to other ills that human beings can and do visit upon one another. For that reason, I do not focus
here on the identity of the torturer as a state official.
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of the person who will be tortured as a wrongdoer; the utility of
torturing the wrongdoer to save innocent others; and the tightness of the
link between the person's status as a wrongdoer and the utility of
torturing him (rather than someone else) in achieving the life-saving
objectives sought.
A. Pain Versus Death
Of greatest interest to me in examining the torture debate is why
there appears to be such broad consensus on the distinct moral status
that torture occupies. Like virtually every moral theorist to take a
position on this question, I agree that torture is nearly always (if not
actually always) wrong. In that, I share the intuition that torture is
"different" and requires a moral analysis that is distinct and more
demanding in some way. But distinct from what? If death is different
from prison, in other words, what is torture different from?
Though seldom the focus of debates over torture, the thing from
which torture is "different" is most clearly death. 56  The various
"camps" in the debate over torture do not typically take the position that
the prohibition against killing people is absolute. 57 In moral terms,
deontologists and utilitarians alike ordinarily acknowledge a role for
justifiable homicide. Those who are not pacifists embrace the
legitimacy of killing within the confines of a just war.58 Some, such as
Immanuel Kant-the consummate deontologist-believe in the
rightness and even essentiality of the death penalty. 59 Many believe that
killing a terminally ill person who wants to die is just.60 The Supreme
56 My concern in this Article regards the questions whether and why torture is normatively
distinct from killing. I thank Robert Ferguson for pointing out that regardless of how one
answers the normative question, one must recognize that there is surely an epistemological
distinction between being tortured and being killed. When we deprive a person of life, we
necessarily cannot know-to the same degree as we understand the consequences of torture-
what we have taken away. In this sense, the deprivation of life introduces a greater unknown than
the infliction of torture. Which way that difference cuts, however, is by no means obvious.
57 See Joyce S. Dubensky & Rachel Lavery, Torture: An Interreligious Debate, in TORTURE
DEBATE, supra note 1, at 162, 167 ("Christian traditions have developed concepts of just wars,
which recognize limited circumstances in which force may be deemed justified.... [M]ost
adherents of this theory oppose torture ....").
58 See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Reflection on the Problem of "Dirty Hands," in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note 1 at 77, 80 (discussingjus ad bellum andjus ad bello).
59 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge
University Press 1991) (1797) ("If, however, he has committed murder he must die. Here there is
no substitute that will satisfy justice."); see also Louis Pojman, In Defense of The Death Penalty
494, reprinted in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 493-502 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2d ed. 2002) ("When the
offender with malice aforethought takes the life of an innocent person, he or she forfeits his or her
own right to life.").
60 See Brief of Amici Curiae In Support of Respondents, Julian M. Whitaker M.D.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1996) (Nos. 96-110, 95-1858); Kathryn L. Tucker &
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1428 2008-2009
2009] WHY TORTURE IS DIFFERENT 1429
Court has said (and many share the view) that police officers may
justifiably kill a dangerous fleeing felon who cannot otherwise be
subdued. 61 And least controversial of all is the moral view that killing a
person who threatens us (or a third party) with imminent death is
justifiable. 62
Furthermore, we do not often encounter the position that killing
another person should be subject to an absolute legal ban, either to
minimize unjustifiable homicides or to express a community norm that
killing is always wrong. 63 One who kills in self-defense need not resign
himself to his rightful punishment or throw himself on the mercy of
jurors who may or may not be willing to nullify an all-encompassing
homicide prohibition. The law is and ought to be clear: if someone
threatens us with death or substantial bodily harm and we cannot safely
retreat or defuse the threat with non-lethal force, we are justified in
killing the person who poses that threat.64
Some proponents of a limited right to torture cite our moral and
legal willingness to tolerate killing under some circumstances as proof
that, a fortiori, torture must also be permissible at times.65 How, they
ask rhetorically, can it be acceptable to kill but not to torture when
killing so obviously represents a worse deprivation than torture does?
Though the implied assertion may initially sound persuasive, its
implicit "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument is deeply flawed. First,
David J. Burman, Physician Aid in Dying: A Humane Option, a Constitutionally Protected
Choice, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 495, 504 (1995) ("[Florced continuation of a life ravaged by pain
and suffering for a competent, terminally-ill adult who has a voluntary and informed desire to
hasten his or her own death is a cruel and demeaning invasion into basic rights of liberty, privacy,
and self-determination."); Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1996) (proposing model legislation for the
legalization of assisted suicide).
61 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (indicating that deadly force directed
against a fleeing felon is lawful when but only when there is good reason to believe that the felon
will otherwise pose a danger of death or substantial bodily harm to officers or other civilians).
62 David Rodin, War and Self Defense, 18.1 ETHICS & INT'L AFF., Winter 2004; Jeff
McMahan, Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker, 104 ETHICS 252, 252 (1994)
("That there are occasions on which it is permissible intentionally to kill another person in self-
defense is an axiom in contemporary ethical theory."); David Wasserman, Justifying Self-
Defense, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 356, 356 (1987) ("Self-defense provides a particularly strong and
unapologetic defense to killing.... a positive good rather than a forgivable lapse.").
63 But see THE MIND OF MAHATMA GANDHI 49 (R.K. Prabhu & U.R. Rao eds., 1945) ("Non-
violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind.... Every murder or other injury, no
matter for what cause, committed or inflicted on another is a crime against humanity.");
HEINRICH ZIMMER, PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA 250 (Joseph Campbell ed., 1956) ("The worst
offense possible, according to the Jaina view, is the killing or injuring of a living being .... ");
Matthew 5: 39-42 ("But I say unto you, ... whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to
him the other also.").
64 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4 (1999);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernon 2007).
65 See e.g., Bagaric & Clark II, supra note 17, at 703 ("[I]t is a lesser evil to inflict physical
harm on a person than to allow large numbers of people, or even a single person, to die.").
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torture is not always "less than" death. Those who support a right to
physician assistance in dying, for example, specifically reject the
pain/death hierarchy and argue that some people legitimately find their
suffering so great that they wish for death and ought to have a legal
right to make that wish a reality, with a doctor's help. 66 Though the
Supreme Court did not recognize a constitutional right to this effect in
Washington v. Glucksberg, a concurring opinion authored by Justice
Souter indicated a readiness to revisit the issue if it turns out that
doctors cannot satisfactorily ameliorate terminal patients' pain with
medication. 67 In such cases, a patient might well have a constitutional
right to seek relief from pain in the only manner available-through
death.68
The Eighth Amendment precedents point in the same direction: we
may kill a limited class of the most heinous criminals as punishment for
their offenses, but we may not inflict severe pain on them, either instead
of, in addition to, or in the process of killing them.69 To put the matter
crudely, if there is a choice between executing a condemned prisoner at
midnight versus tormenting him at midnight and killing him at 1 in the
morning, the former option is constitutionally valid, while the latter-
though it extends his life by an hour-is a blatant violation of the ban
against cruel and unusual punishments. Though killing our fellow
human beings is generally impermissible, both morally and legally, it is
not always and necessarily the worst thing we can do to them.
Deliberately inflicting excruciating pain is often (though not invariably)
worse.
Beyond head-to-head comparisons, it is also the case that the
circumstances under which torture occurs-and the purposes for which
66 See supra note 60. Cf Sherry F. Colb, Opposition to Abortion and Physician Assistance-
In-Dying: The Claim that Choice Can Evolve Into Coercion, FINDLAW, June 11, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20070611 .html.
67 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (indicating
that the Court will revisit issue of physician-assistance in dying if palliative care proves
inadequate to relieve patients' pain).
68 Alternatively, the importance of alleviating one's pain could form the basis for a necessity
defense in response to criminal charges. Cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (refusing to
enjoin federal enforcement of marijuana prohibitions against a dying woman using marijuana for
medical purposes, rejecting the claim of a constitutional right to use marijuana, but suggesting
that appellant could likely assert a common law necessity defense when facing actual prosecution
for her conduct).
69 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("'[T]he unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.., constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment."'); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) ("[P]unishments of torture.., are
forbidden by [the Eighth] amendment to the Constitution"); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981). See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (articulating the duty of
prison officials under the Eighth Amendment to provide prisoners with humane conditions of
confinement, food, shelter, medical care, and safety); KANT, supra note 59, at 142 ("[Death
judicially carried out] must still be freed from any mistreatment that could make the humanity in
the person suffering it into something abominable.").
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it might conceivably be deployed-sometimes differ fundamentally
from those that occasion the deliberate use of deadly force. Given this
disparity in circumstances and goals, comparing torture with killing
might be a bit like comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Even,
in other words, if death were objectively "worse" than torture, it could
be that human beings sometimes confront circumstances in which only
killing will effectively and justifiably address the threat in question.
And it might be, by contrast, that the circumstances under which torture
but not killing would accomplish our objectives are of the sort that
would justify neither torture nor killing. I will discuss the "how
different are apples from oranges" question later, but for now, let us
compare apples with apples.
B. Torture in Uncomplicated Self-Defense
Debates abound regarding what acts "count" as torture. 70
However, there are some things that clearly qualify. If one person bites
through another person's flesh until he crushes bones, for example, that
would seem to fall unambiguously into the category of torture. Indeed,
many torture methods might be conceptualized as modified forms of
biting. To ensure that I am not mistaken for a sadist for having
mentioned a particular method, 7' I will shortly clarify the reason for my
selection.
To determine why the international community, our law, and many
theorists reject torture categorically while they do not do the same for
death, we must hypothesize a case in which killing would be
permissible and ask whether-assuming that torture accomplished the
same objectives as killing would have done-the prohibition on torture
would still apply. Those who defend limited uses of torture routinely
invoke "self-defense" analogies to suggest that the two situations are
essentially equivalent. 72 But the reality is that, most of the time, the
70 See Parry, supra note 10, at 146-49 (discussing the important definitional distinction
between "torture," on the one hand, and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment," on the other);
see Bybee Memo, supra note 29, at 328 (contending that "torture is not the mere infliction of
pain or suffering" and that "[t]he victim must experience intense pain or suffering of the kind that
is equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that
death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will
likely result"); see also Levin Memo, supra note 29 (discrediting definitional argument in Bybee
Memo); see Waldron, supra note 4 (strongly criticizing the entire definitional enterprise when it
comes to torture, because such precise line-drawing suggests inappropriately the legitimacy of
going up to the line (in the way that a speed limit does)).
71 See Richard Posner, supra note 31, at 28 ("But it is typical of Dershowitz's lack of restraint
that he should think it appropriate to reveal to his readers... his preferred form of 'nonlethal
torture."').
72 See Moore, supra note 27, at 320-25; Bybee Memo, supra note 29, at 355 ("[W]e believe
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circumstances that call for justifiable homicide are at least somewhat
distinct from those that, by some lights, call for torture. The following
hypothetical example should help bridge the gap and answer the first
basic question in assessing why torture might be different: whether
deliberately inflicting severe pain is truly off-limits in circumstances in
which it would actually serve the exact same purpose as killing in self-
defense.
1. The Curious Case of Intruding Strangler and Suburban Prey
Suburban Prey is a single, female homeowner who lives in a quiet
suburb. Prey's children are grown, and she is sitting in her living room,
perusing the want ads for opportunities to re-enter the workforce.
Absorbed in her task, she does not notice Intruding Strangler sneaking
into her home through an open window. Strangler is a paid assassin
who has been instructed by his current client to do away with Prey.
Strangler approaches Prey and begins to strangle her with his hands, as
per his modus operandi.
Prey has the right to kill Strangler in self-defense, but she does not
have access to a weapon. She can, however, reach Strangler's hand
with her teeth, so, with the limited strength that she has, she bites hard
into his fingers, breaking the skin. Strangler screams in pain but
continues to strangle Prey, because he is committed to finishing what he
has started, a key to maintaining a successful business as an assassin.
Prey bites harder and begins to fracture Strangler's bones. Strangler
screams again in pain, yelling "Stop biting me!" Prey does not stop,
however, and Strangler-unable to tolerate the pain any longer-lets
go, at which point Prey stops biting him, runs out of her house, and
successfully escapes from her would-be killer.
Prey's actions provide an example of torture in self-defense.
Indeed, the fact pattern presents, in many respects, a paradigm case of
self-defense. Strangler is in the process of actively (and unjustifiably)
attempting to kill Prey when, by her actions, Prey intervenes. Absent
this intervention, Prey would imminently die. Torture is therefore
"necessary" to her survival, with no less restrictive alternative available.
Strangler is a wrongdoer for having brought into being the "tragic
choice" between torturing and dying and can accordingly be said to
"deserve" the harm he suffers (which is proportional to the suffering he
is causing). And Strangler can surrender at any time (by removing his
hands from Prey's throat) to terminate the harm that he suffers. Like
that a defendant accused of violating Section 2340A could have, in certain circumstances,
grounds to properly claim the defense of another.").
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killing in self-defense, the ultimate purpose of Prey's deliberate
infliction of pain on Strangler is to disable him from continuing his life-
threatening assault on her.
What distinguishes Prey's case from killing in self-defense is one
and only one thing: rather than attempt to kill Strangler to disable his
murderous assault, Prey attempts instead to cause him excruciating pain,
to the same end. In other words, the means are torture-the deliberate
infliction of severe pain rather than the intentional infliction of death-
while the ends, in both cases, are the same: terminating the
strangulation. If Prey's attempts to torture her assailant had failed-if
her biting him were not as painfil as she had hoped or if he could
tolerate more pain (and was more committed to her murder) than she
had anticipated-then she would have failed, much as any torturer who
errs about her victim's pain threshold (or any shooter in self-defense
who misses his target) might fail.
In our example, however, as might occur in a case of
interrogational torture, an escalation in pain ultimately "breaks" the
target's will. The pain that Strangler experiences is therefore not
"incidental" to some other objective (as, for example, the suffering of
victims in a bombing operation might be-the goal there is to kill them
or destroy munitions, though the victims' suffering is often as great as
that inflicted in the course of torture). Prey's goal is to cause Strangler
to suffer as a means of forcing him to let go of her (and thus to permit
her to live).
There is no question, for anyone who believes in a right to lethal
self-defense, that Prey acts justifiably in biting Strangler until he cannot
take it anymore. Even an absolute opponent of interrogational torture
under any set of circumstances would have to agree that Prey has every
right to defend her life by biting Strangler. Furthermore, it is difficult to
imagine anyone suggesting-as many do, in the case of interrogational
torture-that the law should officially prohibit Prey's actions and leave
it to executive clemency, jury nullification, or other expressions of
grace to spare her, as appropriate. 73  Prey's behavior is obviously
warranted and the embrace of that normative position ought to be-and
is-reflected in the law as written. 74 Her actions should be and are, in
73 See, e.g., Committee against Torture v. Israel, supra note 54, at 179 (explaining that the
law does not authorize torture but that a necessity defense might nonetheless be available to some
practitioners of it); Gross, supra note 26, at 244 ("My proposal calls for maintaining an absolute
ban on torture while, at the same time, recognizing the possibility (but not certainty) of state
agents acting extralegally and seeking ex post ratification of their conduct.").
74 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 2007) ("A person may, subject to the
provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he
or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from
what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by
such other person . .. A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under
circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: a) The actor reasonably believes that such
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other words, authorized in advance by the law of self-defense.
Accordingly, whatever difference there is between the harms
deliberately inflicted by torture and by death, respectively, does not
limit a victim's (or, presumably, a third party's) options in the face of an
imminent and active attempt on her life by the proposed target of the
torture or death. Circumstances that would justify killing an aggressor
to disable him from imminent, violent action would also and
uncontroversially justify torturing the aggressor instead. (In fact, one
could conceivably characterize Prey's actions as a less extreme measure
than killing Strangler would have been, though I am not committed to
this proposition and do not rely on it here.)
What makes interrogational torture "different" from killing and
accordingly subjects it to international legal condemnation and wide-
scale absolutist opposition is not something inherent in the distinction
between deliberately causing excruciating pain, on the one hand, and
deliberately killing, on the other. The distinction-if there is one-
must therefore lie in the circumstances that give rise to the decision to
inflict torture (as opposed to those that give rise to the decision to kill).
When the circumstances are truly identical, the absolute opposition to
torture disappears.
C. The Defenseless Target
One account of why interrogational torture is uniquely
objectionable relies on the status of the person who is interrogated.
Unlike Intruding Strangler, the assassin of our earlier example, a person
to be subject to interrogational torture is relatively powerless in the face
of his torturers. Consider, by contrast, the soldier in the midst of a
battle. While engaged in a "fair fight," no one is in a practical position
to present her opponent with the option of either revealing information
or undergoing excruciating pain. Such, however, is the position of the
powerless captive. And as Henry Shue and Seth Kreimer both suggest,
there is something deeply immoral-by most lights-about kicking
someone when he is down or, as is specifically the case with a subdued
captive, attacking him when there is nothing he can do to defend
himself against the attack.75  The question that invariably arises,
however, is whether this account of the prisoner undergoing
other person is using or about to use deadly physical force.").
75 See Shue, supra note 35, at 51 ("The torturer inflicts pain and damage upon another person
who, by virtue of now being within his or her power, is no longer a threat and is entirely at the
torturer's mercy."); Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and Screw: Constitutional
Constraints in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 298 (2003) ("[Torture] inflicts
agony on the helpless ....").
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interrogational torture is faithful to the facts.
To answer this question, Shue usefully divides captured prisoners
withholding crucial information-those whom proponents of a limited
authority to torture might identify as potentially legitimate targets-into
three categories: the innocent bystander, the ready collaborator, and the
dedicated enemy.76
In this typology, the first captive, the innocent bystander, has
important information but is not otherwise associated with the project
that her captors aim to thwart. Such a person, Shue suggests, is not
defenseless in the face of her captors: she need only convey her
informational quarry-in the secrecy of which she holds no stake-and
she can avoid the threatened pain altogether.
The ready collaborator, a second captive, is nominally a member of
the enemy's army, but she is nonetheless eager to save herself by
answering her captors' questions and is untroubled by the betrayal that
such a disclosure might represent. Like the innocent captive, then, she
too is not, in theory, defenseless, because she can prevent the threatened
pain by disclosing information that she has no qualms about revealing.
Shue posits a third captive who is different from the first two: the
dedicated enemy. This captive possesses the information that his
captors demand, but he-unlike the others-is committed to keeping
the information secret. He is a true believer in the cause for which he is
fighting, and he is prepared to accept death rather than give up what he
knows about the "ticking bomb" or whatever other catastrophe his
captors hope to avert. To extract the information from him, then, will
require torture-or the breaking of his will. 77 To torture a captive under
these circumstances is illegitimate, argues Shue, because the torturer
confronts the captive with an unacceptable choice-he must either
betray his deeply held beliefs or suffer horrible torments. That, Shue
argues, is truly no choice at all. Like the choices presented to a victim
of religious torture-asked to suffer or forsake his God-such forced
choices are wrong, no matter how worthy the objectives they are meant
to serve.
Though Shue presents a compelling account of what the various
potential torture victims might experience, his argument about the
"dedicated enemy" captive does not adequately distinguish such a
person from the dedicated enemy in the battlefield. Under the laws of
war, a soldier may continue shooting at or otherwise attempting to kill
an enemy soldier unless and until the enemy surrenders, at which point
the latter becomes a prisoner of war, entitled both to survive and to be
76 Shue, supra note 35, at 54.
77 See Sullivan, supra note 19, at 20 ("What torture does is use these involuntary, self-
protective, self-defining resources of human beings against the integrity of the human being
himself. It takes what is most involuntary in a person and uses it to break that person's will.").
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treated humanely.78
What makes the soldier pinned down in the field something other
than "defenseless" in the face of superior enemy force, then, is the
ability to surrender and thereby put a stop to the attack that might
otherwise, lawfully, kill him.79 For a dedicated enemy soldier, however,
surrender could signify the sort of humiliation over which he might well
choose death: surrender betrays the cause, strengthens the will of the
enemy, and demoralizes one's allies. From the perspective of some
soldiers, then, the surrender option is as unacceptable as the revelation
of a "ticking bomb" location would be from the perspective of a
dedicated enemy captive who wants that bomb to explode and kill
civilians, as planned.
To be sure, the soldier is distinct from the captive in one important
respect: the former is armed. Nonetheless, the captive resembles the
soldier in that both are threatened with violence that they have the
power to stop in one and only one way: by surrendering something
valuable (weapons or information), the surrender of which their
loyalties may resist or preclude.
As with the unenthusiastic soldier at war, then, the main distinction
between the "innocent bystander" and "ready collaborator" captives, on
the one hand, and the "dedicated enemy," on the other, is that what the
captors demand is not experienced as a terribly burdensome sacrifice for
the first two but is felt to be overwhelmingly so for the third, to such a
degree that he might try as long as he can to tolerate the excruciating
alternative. When he cannot do so, moreover, there is ignominy in
surrendering, which Shue's approach insightfully acknowledges. Like
dedicated enemy captives, however, dedicated opponents in the
battlefield are also more likely than their less committed comrades to
fight to the death. This does not make it wrong for enemy soldiers to
fire on them rather than be killed; it makes it all the more pressing and
legitimate that they do. These committed fighters pose a graver threat
than the other two categories of soldier, and-at least in the
battlefield-greater force may accordingly be justified.
One could, at this point, be tempted to return to the distinction
between torture and death, and suggest that while many people might be
capable of giving their lives rather than betraying their cause, the
torments of severe physical pain render resistance impossible for
78 See Parry, supra note 10, at 149 ("The Geneva Conventions ban the use of 'torture [or] any
other form of coercion'-including threats, insults, or 'unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment
of any kind'-on prisoners of war. A similar protection extends to civilians during hostilities or
occupations.") (quoting Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12,
1949, arts. 3, 13, 17, available at www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/92.shtml.).
79 The soldier also, of course, has the ability to fire back at the enemy, but surrender might
become the only real option once a soldier perceives himself as sufficiently outnumbered by his
opponents to be effectively committing suicide by continuing to fight.
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virtually everyone. Even Khalid Sheikh Mohammed reportedly
"begg[ed] to confess" after two and a half minutes of water-boarding, a
sustained resistance that apparently garnered him admiration among his
interrogators .80
The argument that death is easier on its victims than torture,
however, is no answer. We have seen that in true self-defense contexts,
torture-like killing-is permissible. However, just as interrogational
torture is not exactly the same as self-defense, neither is the battlefield
exchange of gunfire exactly the same as self-defense, particularly when
the shooters have launched the attack in which they are now killing
their opponents (pending surrender). 81 The overarching goal of force in
the battlefield is victory, not self-preservation. If opponents surrender,
they can, in theory, make the other side's victory bloodless. But if they
do not, the fighting continues until death, capture or eventual surrender.
If one's opponents are committed to the battle, then they will surrender
only-if at all-when they view resistance as futile or decide that they
would prefer to live as prisoners of war than to die on the battlefield.82
The reality that torture may be a more effective means of subduing
an enemy's resistance than the threat of death, moreover, cannot, in and
of itself, render torture impermissible. 83 For some dedicated soldiers,
the fear of imminent death may not be powerful enough to motivate
surrender, while for others, it might be. It would hardly seem coherent,
however, to claim that shooting at the enemy is moral when but only
80 See Sullivan, supra note 19, at 20. (describing waterboarding and its impact: "'The
prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet. Cellophane is
wrapped over the prisoner's face and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex
kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treatment to a
halt.' . . . 'CIA officers who subjected themselves to the waterboarding technique lasted an
average of 14 seconds before caving in. They said Al Qaeda's toughest prisoner, Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, won the admiration of interrogators when he was able to last between two and two
and a half minutes before begging to confess."') (quoting an ABC news report).
81 One might therefore conceive of both battlefield aggression and interrogational torture as
contexts in which a justification that only imperfectly resembles self-defense presents itself. Cf.
Franklin v. State, 18 S.W. 468, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1892) ("A perfect right of self-defense can
only obtain and prevail where the party acted from necessity, and is wholly free from wrong or
blame in occasioning or producing the necessity which required his action, viewed from his
standpoint ... ").
82 One reason for signing onto and abiding by international agreements prohibiting torture is
that one's enemies are more likely to surrender if doing so does not expose a captive to brutality.
See, e.g., Scott Horton, Through a Mirror, Darkly: Applying the Geneva Conventions to "A New
Kind of Warfare ", in TORTURE DEBATE, supra note 1, at 136, 143-44 ("By treating the foreign
military units with dignity accorded by the laws of armed conflict, it was easier to bring them to
surrender and thus bring hostilities to an end. This approach was followed with some success,
from the German perspective, in French North Africa."). This, however, is a pragmatic argument
for enacting laws against torture rather than a moral argument for why torture is always and
necessarily wrong.
83 Indeed, the threat of death itself (even if it will never be carried out) can qualify as a form
of mental torture. Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. §
208.18(a)(4)(iii) (2008).
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when it does nothing to deter the enemy's fire. The efficacy of the
threat of death in leading ultimately to the surrender of the enemy, far
from delegitimating the entire enterprise of war, is arguably its very
essence.
This is not to say, of course, that the purpose of killing in war (or,
for that matter, the purpose of torture) is irrelevant to its morality. One
may use deadly force in self-defense, for example, but not in the
defense of property.84 And a nation's leader may send soldiers overseas
to shoot at other soldiers in a battle to fight injustice but not-in modem
times-to expand territorial holdings by appropriating another nation's
land. 85 In the interrogational torture context, even if we assume that
defusing a ticking bomb is a legitimate objective that justifies torture, it
would not follow that a captor could properly demand a confession to
serve other, less compelling ends, such as prosecution (not to mention
religious conversion, sadism, or simple domination). 86
Once we accept, however, that the killing of even dedicated enemy
soldiers in war is sometimes justifiable but must nonetheless cease
when the soldiers surrender, we have implicitly rejected Shue's putative
distinction between using interrogational torture against those who care
strongly about allowing the ticking bomb to explode and using it against
those who do not. If employing violence to defuse the ticking bomb is
morally permissible when a "ready collaborator" holds the necessary
information, then using violence against one's non-surrendering
"dedicated enemy" to defuse the bomb cannot be considered wrong
simply because the enemy would prefer almost any other fate to that of
surrender. The distinction between the relative defenselessness of the
84 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.031 (2007) ("[T]he person is justified in the use of deadly force
only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the imminent
commission of a forcible felony,"); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-3(a) (2007) (containing similar
statutory provision); ME. REV. STAT. 17-A, § 105 (2007) (containing similar statutory provision);
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(d) (1962).
85 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition OfAggression: Sieve
or Substance (Oct. 1995), http://www.benferencz.org/arts/13.html (discussing Special Committee
on the question of defining aggression, 23 UN GAOR, 6th Comm., UN Doc. A/7185/Rev. 11
(1968); 24 UN GAOR, 6th Comm., UN Doc. A/7620 (1969); 25 UN GAOR, 6th Comm., UN
Doc. A/8090 (1970); 26 UN GAOR, 6th Comm., UN Doc. A/8419 (1971); 27 UN GAOR, 6th
Comm., UN Doc. A/8719 (1972); 28 UN GAOR, 6th Comm., UN Doc. A/9019 (1973); and 29
UN GAOR, 6th Comm., UN Doc. A/9619 (1974)); see also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND
UNJUST WARS 111 (2d ed. 1992) ("Wars can only be fought, then, if some 'universal moral
principle' requires it: the preservation of peace, the survival of democracy, and so on.").
86 David Luban has identified these as purposes frequently (if not always officially) expressed
in the act of torture. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, in TORTURE
DEBATE, supra note 1, at 35, 37. ("The widespread, perhaps universal, presence of sadistic
fantasies, more or less deeply repressed, may help explain what happens in actual torturers .. ");
Krauthammer, supra note 18, at 24 (proposing exceptions to a ban against torture for "(I) the
ticking time bomb and (2) the slower-fuse high-level terrorist (such as KSM)"); Bagaric & Clarke
II, supra note 17, at 710 ("A bright line can be drawn between using torture as a last resort to save
innocent lives, and using torture as an act of suppression, domination, or cruelty.").
1438 [Vol. 30:4
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1438 2008-2009
WHY TORTURE IS DIFFERENT
dedicated enemy soldier as compared to the willing collaborator thus
cannot perform the work of demonstrating why the use of
interrogational torture against a captive dedicated enemy soldier is
necessarily immoral. 87 Indeed, if the hypothetical bomb-setter can
avoid torture by revealing information that is in his possession, he is
necessarily not defenseless (in that he can do something to avoid the
pain), an insight that Shue surfaces quite well but which he then
unconvincingly rejects in the case of the dedicated terrorist. All that the
knowledgeable bomb-setter must do is tell his captor where the bomb is
or where the suicide bombers planning to detonate themselves are
located (or otherwise how to prevent the looming tragedy). Like the
soldier in the field who must surrender or be killed, the captive,
knowledgeable terrorist who is threatened with torture can surrender
what he has (information) and thus avoid a more terrible fate. To be
defenseless is to have no acceptable alternative, and if demanding life-
saving information is itself legitimate, then-no matter how distasteful
it is for the target to reveal it--compelling the revelation of that
information through a threat of torture or through torture itself might
conceivably be legitimate as well.
D. Is Interrogational Torture Ever Justified?
In evaluating the morality of interrogational torture as an absolute
matter, the question we ask is whether there could in theory be a case-
unlike most or even virtually all other cases-where the person who
tortures another for life-saving information is behaving no differently
(as a moral matter) from the person who tortures another to disable him
from actively committing a murder, as Suburban Prey does in defending
herself by torturing Intruding Strangler. As there is likely to be near-
universal agreement by deontologists and utilitarians alike, in other
words, on the morality and justice of Suburban Prey's actions toward
Intruding Strangler, we might ask whether a morally equivalent case of
interrogational torture is conceivable and, if not, why not. If a torturer
knows that her captive is aware of the location of a ticking bomb (but
knows nothing more than that), is it justifiable (in the way that self-
defense is justifiable) for her to torture the captive so long as he refuses
to reveal the location of the bomb? Why or why not?
Consider an example that will sound, in many respects, like self-
defense. Indeed, it is a variant on an example proposed to me as self-
defense by various people, although it will become clear shortly that it
87 It would also be perverse to conclude, as Shue's analysis does, that torture is least justified
against the most culpable actors.
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is not technically a case of self-defense. This example involves Oxygen
Robber and Asthmatic Homeowner. Like Intruding Strangler, Oxygen
Robber breaks into a home with the goal of killing its inhabitant-in
this case, Asthmatic Homeowner. Unlike Strangler, however, Robber is
not very strong and will not be able to subdue Homeowner physically.
Instead, Robber uses stealth. She knows that Homeowner requires an
inhaler whenever exposed to smoke, so she carefully slips the life-
saving inhaler out of Homeowner's pants pocket and hides it behind
Homeowner's refrigerator, without Homeowner noticing. Robber then
lights a cigarette.
At this point, Homeowner notices Robber and yells "What are you
doing? Put that cigarette out!" Robber puts out the cigarette and
watches Homeowner begin wheezing and growing increasingly short of
breath as the smoke enters his lungs. Homewner reaches into his
pockets and begins panicking when he notices that the inhaler is
missing. He turns accusingly to Robber and yells, "What have you
done with it?"
Robber smiles in response and says, "I'm not telling, but don't
expect to find it any time soon." Homeowner knows that he has only
about one minute left before he will be completely unable to breathe or
speak. He grabs a lighter, flicks it on, takes hold of Robber's arm, and
brings the flame to her hand. Robber screams and struggles but cannot
wrest her hand away from Homeowner.
"Please stop!!!" yells Robber. "Tell me where my inhaler is, and
I'll stop," gasps Homeowner. "Behind the refrigerator!" screams
Robber, after which Homeowner pulls her to the designated area, sees
the inhaler, and stops burning Robber's hand, greedily reaching for his
inhaler and saving his own life.
Is this self-defense by Asthmatic Homeowner? No. Self-defense
involves disabling an ongoing or imminent attack. Here, the attack-
consisting of exposure to smoke and concealment of the inhaler-has
already occurred. The only thing left to the attack is for the
consequences of the attacker's actions to come to fruition. Disabling or
even killing the attacker will therefore do nothing to save the victim's
life: the victim needs action, not inaction; specifically, he needs
information that only the attacker knows. If the attacker were to leave
the house or otherwise become inaccessible, the victim would be
doomed. As in the case of interrogational torture and unlike in the case
of self-defense, then, the victim needs the assailant or, at least, someone
who knows what the assailant knows. Like in the case of a poisonous
snake who has already bitten her prey, it is too late to stop Oxygen
Robber and, accordingly, too late for self-defense. By burning Oxygen
Robber, Asthmatic Homeowner has thus engaged in interrogational
torture.
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Does that make Asthmatic Homeowner's conduct wrong? It does
not necessarily "feel" that different from Intruding Strangler's self-
defense case. After all, the target of the torture is in both cases a
wrongdoer who has acted to kill the soon-to-be torturer. The intended
homicide victim, in both cases, is torturing in the service of saving her
or his own life from the wrongdoer. And in each case, the failure to
torture will certainly lead to the death of the intended homicide victim.
To some people, it would seem crazy to say that Homeowner's
actions were unjustified. How could the justifiability of torturing an
assailant turn on whether the assailant is in the process of killing the
would-be torturer-as in the case of Intruding Strangler and Suburban
Prey-and the goal of the torture is to disable the assailant, or whether
the torturer's assailant has instead already completed the actions
necessary to cause the would-be torturer's death-as in the case of
Oxygen Robber and Asthmatic Homeowner-and the goal of the torture
is to compel the assailant actively to prevent the consequences of her
conduct from coming to pass?
1. Wrongdoing
One potential distinction between acting in self-defense and using
interrogational torture lies in the relative likelihood of harming an actual
wrongdoer in each case. While true self-defense necessarily targets a
wrongdoer, interrogational torture need not do so.
As we know from just about every existing analysis of
interrogational torture and its morality, we must confront, among other
questions, how to deal with the "innocent" captive who knows life-
saving information but refuses to disclose it, for whatever reason.88 By
"innocent," I mean that he has in no way set in motion the life-
threatening events against which torture is to be deployed. Unlike
Intruding Strangler, for example, he is not doing (nor has he done)
anything to hurt anyone. His complicity in the death of innocents is
accordingly entirely passive, the sort of complicity we ordinarily call an
"omission" in the act/omission dichotomy or the refusal to become a
"Good Samaritan."
Take the case of Bomb Admirer. Admirer's childhood friend
Explosive Sender has arranged for a disciple, Dynamite Holder, to
detonate herself in a heavily populated skyscraper, thereby causing
maximum damage and glorifying the "Secular Humanists," a terrorist
sect of which Sender is the leader and Holder a member. Due to an
88 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 27, at 323-24 (discussing the moral implications of torturing a
terrorist who knows life-saving information versus torturing an uninvolved person who happens
to know the same life-saving information).
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email interception, the police learn that Sender has confided in his
friend Admirer the address of the location where Holder will perform
her martyrdom mission. The email contains a time of detonation but not
an actual location. It says that "I told my trusted friend Bomb Admirer
where the bomb will explode, because I love him like a brother and can
keep nothing from him. This will all happen in four hours at the
location on which Holder and I agreed." The police cannot locate either
Sender or Holder, though they make every effort to do so and to
increase security measures surrounding all high-rise buildings in the
city. The clock is ticking.
The police immediately arrest Bomb Admirer, who is sitting in his
living room at the time, watching the television program "24." The
agents ask Admirer whether he knows about the terrorist plot. Admirer
acknowledges that he does but refuses to tell them where the targeted
building is. Though he is not himself a member of the Secular
Humanists, he cares deeply for Explosive Sender and does not want to
frustrate his plans for glorifying an organization whose tenets are quite
appealing to Admirer. The agents take Admirer into custody as a
material witness.
With Admirer shackled in an interrogation room, only one hour left
before the known moment of detonation, and no leads on the
whereabouts of Dynamite Holder or Explosive Sender, the police bring
out the waterboard. "I am afraid of drowning," yells Admirer. "I have
done nothing wrong. Please don't hurt me!" he pleads. The agents
ignore Admirer's pleas and begin the waterboarding procedure. 89 After
five seconds, Admirer waves his arms and tries to scream, "Okay! I'll
tell you! Please let me tell you!" The agents release him from the
device, and he tells them the exact location where Dynamite Holder will
detonate herself at the appointed time-a building where she is
currently hiding in a broom closet on the second floor. The police visit
the location, find Holder, and defuse the bomb before it can explode.
In this example, Bomb Admirer is not entirely defenseless. He has
the information that the police want, and the police legitimately seek to
obtain that information. If Admirer surrenders, he can avoid being
tortured.90 He does not, however, want to surrender. He believes in the
cause for which Holder and Sender work. It is therefore only when
tortured that Admirer submits to the demands of the police and reveals
Holder's whereabouts. He in that sense resembles Shue's "dedicated
89 See Sullivan, supra note 19, at 20.
90 Not everyone agrees that waterboarding qualifies as torture. In a January 29, 2008 letter to
the Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey refused to
call the technique unambiguously illegal, stating, "There are some circumstances where current
law would appear clearly to prohibit the use of waterboarding. Other circumstances would present
a far closer question." Phillip Shenon, Mukasey Offers View on Waterboarding, N.Y. TIMES,
January 30, 2008, at A15.
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enemy."
Yet Bomb Admirer, unlike an enemy soldier or a member of a
terrorist group, is not a causal agent in the events that unfold: he has
neither set in motion nor carried out any part of the suicide bombing.
He is not, in other words, the person from whom the threat of harm
radiates. Unlike Intruding Strangler, who himself tried to kill Suburban
Prey, or Oxygen Robber, who tried to do the same to Asthmatic
Homeowner, Admirer did not conceive of the idea of a suicide
bombing, did not send anyone to carry it out, and did not agree to do
anything to facilitate its execution. Admirer chose to keep the plot a
secret, even when threatened, because he felt a kinship with the leader
of the group carrying it out. Is it morally permissible for the police to
torture someone it knows is an innocent person? It is noteworthy that
such an example simply would not occur in a self-defense scenario. An
unjustified attacker is necessarily the party engaged in wrongdoing. 9'
He is the aggressor, and accordingly, killing or torturing him is
acceptable (as in the case of Intruding Strangler). But is Bomb Admirer
really so innocent?
91 In referring to a person "engaged in wrongdoing," I mean the agent from whom the
aggression and threat of harm project. It is possible for an aggressor to be insane or otherwise not
criminally responsible for his actions, but that does not diminish the victim's justifiable right of
self-defense. Even in the case of the insane attacker, in other words, we attribute the threat (and
thus a kind of functional culpability) to the person who attacks, and we accordingly allow self-
defensive lethal force to be directed against him. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE and
Commentaries, Comment to § 3.11, at 159 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("The reason for
legitimating protective force extends to cases where the force it is employed against is neither
criminal nor actionable-so long as it is not affirmatively privileged."); Heather R. Skinazi, Not
Just a "Conjured Afterthought": Using Duress as a Defense for Battered Women Who "Fail to
Protect," 85 CAL. L. REV. 993, 1021-22 (1997) ("[S]elf-defense can also be invoked against
innocent aggressors. By innocent aggressors, I mean insane, incompetent or mistaken
aggressors .... [Ilt also permits killing an innocent threat in self-defense."); see generally
Laurence A. Alexander, Justification and Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1177 (1987);
George Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985); GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 855-75 (1978).
In Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal
Theory, which appears in the July 1973 issue of the Israel Law Review, 8 ISR. L. REV. 367, as
well as in Chapter 9 of STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW (Edward M. Wise & G.O.
Mueller eds., 1975), George Fletcher articulates the problem of the psychotic aggressor - the
person who poses a threat of death or serious bodily harm to another person but is nonetheless not
criminally responsible for that threat. See also George P. Fletcher & Luis Chiesa, Self-Defense
and the Psychotic Aggressor, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l 157614; and my comment in response,
Justifying Homicide Against Innocent Aggressors Without Denying Their Innocence, in
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (2008) (draft with author). Because I share the view that
deadly force (or torture) is justifiable in self-defense against a psychotic aggressor, a view explicit
in U.S. law of self-defense, see supra, I refer to people whose imminent conduct poses a threat of
unjustifiable death or serious bodily harm as "wrongdoers," regardless of personal culpability.
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a. Actually Innocent?
Some commentators argue that people like Bomb Admirer are not
in fact innocent. Michael Moore, for example, maintains that because it
would be trivially easy for a captive like Bomb Admirer to disclose
what he knows to his captors, he is not that different from Explosive
Sender and Dynamite Holder, the people who conspire and carry out the
planning and ultimate detonation of the ticking bomb. 92 Unlike the
usual "Bad Samaritan" who chooses not to rescue someone in trouble,
Bomb Admirer finds himself in a situation in which nothing could be
simpler than revealing what he knows. Failing, under those
circumstances, to do so is, on this theory, tantamount to active murder.93
As Miriam Gur-Arye notes in response to Moore's argument,
however, the law does not treat "Bad Samaritans" in such circumstances
as remotely the equivalent of murderers themselves. 94 Even where
there are "Good Samaritan" (mandatory rescue) laws on the books, 95
failure to aid typically constitutes a misdemeanor, at most, and
accordingly carries a relatively light sentence. 96 The fact that a "Bad
Samaritan" could easily come to a victim's aid, moreover, is not unique
to Michael Moore's innocent captive whose knowledge could defuse a
ticking bomb. It is instead a common prerequisite to the application of
existing Good Samaritan laws. 97  Judged by our positive law, it
therefore appears that the moral status of Bomb Admirer is very
different from that of Explosive Sender. On most accounts of
92 See Moore, supra note 27, at 325.
93 Id.
94 See Miriam Gur-Arye, Can the War Against Terror Justify the Use of Force in
Interrogation?, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 183, 192-95.
95 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2006); Wis.
STAT, § 940.34 (2006); Ontario Good Samaritan Act, S.O. 2001, c. 2; THE FRENCH PENAL CODE
art. 63, in GERHARD O.w. MUELLER, THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES
(Gerhard Ow. Mueller & Jean F. Moreau trans., 1960); Criminal Code Act 155 (N. Terr. Austl.);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit, 12, § 519 (2007).
96 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268 § 40 (providing as punishment for violation of a Good
Samaritan law "a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than two thousand and five hundred
dollars."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-5.1 (2007) ("Any person who violates the provisions of this
section shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six (6) months, or by a fine of
not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000)."); MINN.
STAT. § 604A.01 (2006) ("A person who violates this subdivision is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (2007) ("Any person who violates this subsection
is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.").
97 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268 § 40 (2007) ("[T]o the extent that said person can do so
without danger or peril to himself or others .... "); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-5.1 (2007)
("[T]o the extent that the person can do so without danger of peril to the person or others .... );
MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2006) (stating a similar statutory requirement); WIS. STAT. § 940.34 (d)
(2006) ("A person need not comply with this subsection if any of the following apply:...
Compliance would place him or her in danger.").
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permissible interrogational torture, the torment of Bomb Admirer will
likewise prove far more difficult to justify than that of Explosive
Sender.
By contrast to Moore (who would permit the torture of Bomb
Admirer, the Bad Samaritan), Gur-Arye argues that only a true
wrongdoer, who has set in motion a ticking bomb-Explosive Sender,
in our example-may justifiably be tortured for information he holds
and the disclosure of which will prevent the death of many. 98 Gur-Arye
suggests that only when people hold a duty of care toward another (a
duty that may result from a special relationship or from having caused
the dangerous situation in the first place) will their omissions violate the
sorts of criminal prohibitions ordinarily reserved for those who act.99
Among the people who have a duty to intervene, she argues, are
those who have set in motion the chain of events that will, absent
intervention, lead to a person's death. As Gur-Arye explains, for
example, if someone creates an overwhelming risk that a victim will
suffer a fatal injury, and the victim later dies because no one competent
intervened to save him from the realization of that risk, the risk creator
is responsible for the death. 100 Once a person shoots another, then, the
shooter becomes responsible for preventing any foreseeable harm that
ensues as a result, regardless of whether a third party makes matters
worse by botching or failing to carry out what should have been an easy
rescue. Because the shooter in this example can be punished severely
for his failure to intervene after the shooting, the argument goes, so
someone like Explosive Sender (but unlike Bomb Admirer) may be
subject to torture for failing to reveal life-saving information, as a
matter of self-defense.
I would conceptualize this approach to interrogational torture as
"self-defense against a delegated threat" and elaborate it as follows.
Though the captive Explosive Sender is no longer a threat in the way
that the contemporaneously attacking Intruding Strangler is, Sender is in
some sense a continuing threat via a proxy-in Sender's case, Dynamite
Holder. Sender controls Holder from afar by having sent her to carry
out a suicide bombing (and by possessing information that could, if
divulged, prevent her from completing their joint mission). Similarly,
98 See Gur-Arye, supra note 94, at 183-84 ("Although some readers may object to the
potential toleration of interrogational force at all, my proposal would absolutely forbid such
methods against those who did not directly cause the potential danger in the first place ... ").
99 Id. ("It is important to note that even in legal systems imposing Good Samaritan legal duty
(mainly in Europe), the Bad Samaritan is not held liable for the consequences that she could have
prevented. Unlike Moore, those legal systems do not see the Bad Samaritan as part of the threat
to the person endangered.").
100 See id. at 194-95 ("Most legal systems tend to treat equally those whose acts have harmed
other persons and those whose acts have created only a danger of harm but who later refrain from
intervening to save other persons from being harmed.").
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Oxygen Robber could be said to constitute a continuing threat to
Asthmatic Homeowner, even after the smoke is in the air and the inhaler
hidden. On this approach, for the captor to act in self-defense, in
Sender's case, is for her to act aggressively (through torture) in a
manner that takes into account the distance (a distance put in place by
the aggressor) between Sender and his instrument of destruction
(Holder).
Sender, like Oxygen Robber and Intruding Strangler in our earlier
examples, has several of the attributes of an aggressive attacker. Like
both of the other would-be killers, Sender is a wrongdoer. He is, in
other words, the person who actively and deliberately put in place the
circumstances that now threaten the lives of innocent people. By
contrast to Bomb Admirer, Sender is not simply a useful
(knowledgeable) bystander who could help but chooses not to. Sender
is the bad guy.
In addition to his wrongdoing, Sender is capable of stopping the
harm he has set in motion (by revealing what he knows) and thus also of
protecting himself from the threatened interrogational torture. He is, in
other words, not defenseless. As we have seen, two factors play a
preliminary role in distinguishing justifiable killing and torture in self-
defense from unjustifiable instances of killing and torture. These
factors are: first, wrongdoing by the torture target, and second, the
target's ability to comply and surrender and thereby to avoid or end the
threat of torture or death to himself while simultaneously saving lives.
b. The Wrongdoing Factor
To appreciate the importance of wrongdoing, consider a slight
variation on one of the scenarios that we have examined. Imagine that
Suburban Prey's neighbor sees Intruding Strangler break into Suburban
Prey's home. The neighbor, who observes what is happening through
her window, calls the police. The police happen to have present in their
stationhouse Son Of Strangler, Strangler's beloved 15-year-old son
(who came to the police to report the theft of his bicycle). The police
immediately call Suburban Prey's home, get the answering machine,
and start torturing Son Of Strangler so that his father can hear the boy's
authentic screams. Intruding Strangler, recognizing the sound of his
son's voice and the anguish his son is experiencing, immediately
releases his victim, as the police anticipated he would do, and picks up
the phone, begging the police to stop harming his son, a request to
which they promptly accede as Prey makes her escape.
Did the police do the right thing here? Most moral theorists (and I)
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would say no. 10 1 Though Strangler is a wrongdoer, his son Son is not.
Son-even more so than Bomb Admirer-has not behaved in a manner
that would compromise the rights that every person possesses
(including, by most moral accounts, the right not to be subjected to
torture).
c. Capacity to Comply
A second factor distinguishes Son of Strangler from Intruding
Strangler and Bomb Admirer. Unlike the latter two people, Son Of
Strangler is not only completely innocent but also utterly defenseless.
All he can do is cry out in pain until his father will no longer tolerate his
suffering. There is nothing Son can surrender to the police that will
prevent them from torturing him. Because he is both innocent and
defenseless, he is fully entitled to be free of deliberate killing and
torture, regardless of how effective such measures might be in
manipulating his father to let go of Prey.
The second variation on the Strangler scenario exposes another
morally significant distinction-that between what the police are doing
to Strangler-psychologically tormenting a powerful wrongdoer by
physically torturing his son-and what they are doing to Son Of
Strangler himself-torturing an innocent and defenseless person. The
latter of these is, by most accounts, a moral wrong. The wrongfulness
of the former is perhaps less clear. In a novel entitled Just Revenge,
(beware of plot spoiler) Alan Dershowitz writes of a character who
survived the Holocaust only later to find the Nazi who had tortured him
and killed his children during the War, enjoying a fulfilling life with his
beloved family in the United States, under an assumed identity. 02 The
survivor is unable to find justice in a court of law, so he designs a
revenge plot in which the Nazi is forced to watch videotapes of his own
child and grandson being murdered, after which he is given the option
101 See Andrew C. McCarthy, Torture: Thinking About the Unthinkable, in TORTURE DEBATE,
supra note 1, at 98, 107 (asserting that most people would be opposed to the torture of an
innocent, "like harming a terrorist's children to induce him to talk"); Moore, supra note 27, at
292 ("No one should torture innocent children-even when done to produce a sizeable gain in
aggregate welfare."); id. at 293 ("If I were a Russian... I would be deeply ashamed that the
security force that acts in my name (the KGB) castrated and killed an innocent Arab who
happened to be the brother of one of the terrorists... even though that act brought about the
release of the kidnapped diplomats .. "). Police, for example, may not torture or threaten family
members of a kidnapper as a means of motivating the kidnapper to release his victim. See Heidi
M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 271 n.56 (1996) ("A police
officer cannot torture the sister of a gang member in order to prevent him from torturing other
innocent persons.").
102 ALAN DERSHOWITZ, JUST REVENGE (1999).
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(which he takes) of committing suicide. 103
After the Nazi's suicide, the reader learns that none of the man's
family members were actually harmed. The videotapes were doctored
so that the Holocaust survivor's tormentor would suffer some of the
anguish that the survivor himself had experienced but without any
innocent people coming to real harm. The book does not exactly
embrace the survivor's actions, although it is sympathetic to him (as
most readers would presumably be), and the novel's title offers the
possibility that justice has been served. By hurting only the man who
hurt him-only the wrongdoer-the survivor chose his victim well.
And even if one strongly believes that revenge is an illegitimate
enterprise, a belief that the novel does not rule out, one can still see that
there is an important moral distinction between what the survivor did to
the Nazi and what he might have done (but did not in fact do) to the
Nazi's family.
In the case of interrogational torture, by contrast to revenge, the
objective is not to satisfy a desire for retribution but to save lives. More
is generally permissible in the service of saving lives than in the course
of punishment or revenge. Under the criminal law, for example, a
would-be rape victim may kill her assailant in self-defense, but a rapist
may not, after the fact, be executed as a punishment for his crime, as
such punishment runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishments.104
Even if saving a life is a more worthy enterprise than retribution,
however, the status of the target of action in the service of either one of
these objectives is significant: deliberately bringing pain and death to
the innocent is quite broadly viewed as unacceptable, while wrongdoers
may be said to bring some violence-in the form, at the very least, of
self-defense torture or death-onto themselves. It is by analogy to self-
defense that we find the survivor's actions in Just Revenge forgivable, if
not justifiable, because they are limited to harming the guilty Nazi.
2. How Interrogational Torture Utilizes the Tortured
If some view the torture of Explosive Sender (the terrorist) as the
moral equivalent of Suburban Prey's uncontroversially legitimate
torture of Intruding Strangler, then why do others argue that it is wrong
to torture Explosive Sender but right to torture Intruding Strangler? The
distinction cannot be between death and torture, for in both cases,
torture is at stake. In both cases, moreover, the target of the torture is a
103 Id. at 147-55.
104 Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1)(b)(1) (2007) (permitting deadly force to protect
against rape), with Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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wrongdoer and poses (or participates in) a current threat-Intruding
Strangler directly and Explosive Sender by his proxy, Dynamite Holder,
to whom he has delegated the job of explosive device. And finally, both
Intruding Strangler and Explosive Sender are capable of terminating
their own torture or avoiding it altogether by surrendering. In
Strangler's case, he can surrender Prey and thereby preserve her life; in
Sender's case, he can disclose Holder's location and thus foil the
murder-suicide plot. Neither is therefore defenseless.
There is at least one difference between Strangler and Explosive
Sender, however. The difference stems from the delegation of the threat
in the latter case from Sender to Holder. That delegation does not
mitigate Sender's culpability (and may arguably aggravate it, given the
law's approach to conspiracy'0 5), nor does it diminish Sender's capacity
to surrender. It does, however, alter the nature of what the intending
savior of human lives is accomplishing by torturing him.
In the case of Intruding Strangler, Suburban Prey is, by torturing
her assailant, disabling him from continuing his attack. The torture-
the deliberate infliction of severe pain-is intended, in other words, to
make Strangler stop what he is doing. In Sender's case, by contrast, the
torture is not intended to stop him. It is too late to stop him, precisely
because he has already delegated the act of destruction to another entity
(by sending his human bomb, Dynamite Holder, on her mission). The
torture is thus intended to force Sender to act to help stop Holder from
carrying out the attack. Indeed, almost by definition, interrogational
torture is meant not to disable the person being tortured but, instead, to
motivate that person to act affirmatively-to convey information to the
torturer. In theory, then, anyone possessing such information could be
made useful through torture. The confluence between a person's status
as a wrongdoer (i.e., his being the source of unjust aggression) and his
utility to the torturer, is accordingly contingent--dependent, that is, on
the particular facts of the case-rather than analytic-necessarily so, as
it is in the case of self-defense. Almost by definition, in other words,
effective self-defense-unlike effective interrogational torture-must
target the person who is carrying out the attack. If it fails to do so, it
will fail to disable the attack.
Should the contingent nature of this combination (of wrongdoing
and utility) matter? To explore this question, we turn from the infliction
of torture to the use of deadly force, on the understanding-provided by
our discussion of Intruding Strangler and Suburban Prey-that it is the
goal the torturer aims to achieve rather than anything inherent in torture
105 The fact of a conspiracy is aggravating rather than mitigating and accordingly reduces the
need for culpable conduct bringing the perpetrators closer to completion of the offense. See 16
AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 3 (2008) (conspiracy focuses on intent, while attempt focuses on
conduct).
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itself that might categorically distinguish it from killing.
Consider now the case of Heart Shooter. Shooter works for a man
named Gunshot Victim until Victim fires Shooter for poor performance
on the job. After her termination, Shooter begins to plot the murder of
Victim, believing (without good reason) that her termination was
unjustified and must be avenged. Shooter purchases a gun and,
according to plan, shoots Victim in the chest at a crowded subway
station. Victim is rushed to the hospital, where surgeons discover that
he needs a heart transplant by the next day if he is to survive. Everyone
agrees that a donor heart will not become available in time.
Upon hearing this news, Gunshot Victim's daughter, Child Of
Victim, immediately hatches a plan to save her father. Child kidnaps
Heart Shooter and brings her to Gunshot Victim's bedside, at which
point Child crushes Shooter's skull with a bat, killing Shooter. Child
(who happens to be chief of surgery at the hospital) immediately
summons a transplant team to move Shooter's heart from Shooter to
Victim. The transplant team-unaware that Child herself killed
Shooter-performs the life-saving surgery, and Gunshot Victim
receives a healthy prognosis.
We shall shortly examine the moral implications of Child's
actions. But first imagine an alternative scenario. What if Gunshot
Victim saw Shooter pointing a gun at him at the subway station? At
that moment, he could have-with justification-killed Shooter in
self--defense. And if Gunshot Victim's daughter Child had witnessed
the same scene, then she too could-with equal justification-have
killed Shooter. Like Suburban Prey vis-d-vis Intruding Strangler in our
earlier example, either Gunshot Victim or Child Of Victim could
subject Shooter to whatever was necessary (reasonably consistent with
other travelers' safety) to disable the latter from pulling the trigger in
Gunshot Victim's direction.
But does this resolution of the alternative scenario mean that Child
acts justifiably in the first scenario when she kills Shooter for a donor
heart? Our intuitions and the criminal law tell us "no" (or, at the very
least, "we're ambivalent"), regardless of how firmly we might believe
in Child's right to kill Shooter on the subway platform. What
distinguishes these two cases from each other?
Let us first consider the ways in which the two scenarios are the
same. In both cases, the person to be killed-Shooter-is a wrongdoer.
Indeed, she may be more culpable in the first scenario, because she has
already carried out her intention to shoot (and attempt to kill) Gunshot
Victim. In the alternative scenario, it was still possible for Shooter to
change her mind at the last moment and hold her fire. Yet it is in the
first example (of heart donation, where the target is more culpable) and
not the second example (of killing on the subway platform, where the
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target may be less culpable) that moral ambivalence about-or outright
opposition to-the killing of Shooter emerges. So Shooter's culpability
or wrongdoing alone cannot supply the key to distinguishing between
the two scenarios.
What about the power or defenselessness of the target? In scenario
1, when Shooter is killed for her heart, she is obviously defenseless.
There is nothing that she can do that will call off the assault--Child
wants her heart for Gunshot Victim and may not acquire it without
causing Shooter's death. It is too late for Shooter to save Gunshot
Victim without herself dying.
Does the defenselessness of Shooter the heart donor (scenario 1)
necessarily distinguish her from Shooter the attempted assassin who has
not yet fired her weapon (scenario 2, where killing her is justifiable)?
In an important sense, Shooter the attempted assassin, once she has
pointed a gun at her quarry, has already-like Shooter the heart donor-
passed the point of no return. Neither Gunshot Victim nor Child Of
Victim has a legal obligation even to warn Shooter that she will die if
she does not drop her weapon, partly because such a warning could
easily result in Shooter's more quickly pulling the trigger. 106
Shooter the attempted assassin has therefore, effectively, become
defenseless at the moment that she arrived one step away from killing
Gunshot Victim. She may therefore be killed immediately, in self-
defense. Similarly, in our first scenario (Shooter the heart donor), there
is nothing that Shooter can do to avoid Child's killing her for her heart.
Accordingly, like wrongdoing, defenselessness at the relevant moment
cannot help us differentiate between these two scenarios.
What about the stakes? That is, what are the respective
consequences of failing to act in the proposed manner, under each set of
circumstances? In the second (attempted assassin) scenario, a failure to
act (i.e., to shoot or otherwise attack Shooter) will likely lead to
Gunshot Victim's death by shooting. In the first (heart donor) scenario,
failing to act will likely lead to Gunshot Victim's death, also by
shooting (though including the intervening failure to supply a
replacement for the heart destroyed in the shooting). The stakes may in
fact be higher in the first (heart donor) scenario: uncertainties in the
second (attempted assassin) scenario about whether Heart Shooter will
actually shoot Gunshot Victim at all and whether, if she does, her shot
will in fact damage a vital organ, make Gunshot Victim's survival far
more likely in the second (attempted assassin) scenario than it is in the
first (heart donor), where we know that he will die without a
106 A police officer, for example, must issue a warning before shooting only if she can do so
without grave risk to herself. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (Police
may use deadly force against a dangerous fleeing felon "if necessary to prevent escape, and if,
where feasible, some warning has been given.") (emphasis added).
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replacement heart and where we have great confidence that no
replacement heart will become available in time through normal
channels.
If anything, then, based on the stakes, action is more warranted in
the first (heart donor) scenario-where inaction will almost certainly
lead to Gunshot Victim's death-than in the second (attempted
assassin), where there are more unknowns. In short, both scenarios
involve a wrongdoer who is now a defenseless target of deadly force,
and both likewise involve a grave risk of death to an utterly innocent
party if deadly force is not used.
There is, however, one important difference between the two
scenarios. In the first (heart donor) scenario, Child Of Victim kills
Heart Shooter to make Shooter useful to Gunshot Victim in a particular
way-as a source of a vital organ, her heart. Child, in other words, is
not killing Shooter to prevent the latter from engaging in wrongdoing-
Shooter has already so engaged, and the question now is only how much
harm will result.
Child is killing Shooter to use her organ to save Gunshot Victim's
life. We see this, for example, in the method by which the killing is
accomplished: unlike in the second (attempted assassin) scenario, Child
could not save her father by shooting Shooter in the heart, for example,
because Child wishes to harvest that heart. To disable a predator is
therefore not the goal in the first scenario; the goal is, instead, to acquire
a donor heart from someone who happens to be the shooter.
The notion that killing a wrongdoer who will be useful once dead
is worse than killing (and thus disabling) a wrongdoer who will no
longer be useful once dead is, to some degree, perverse. In the
attempted assassin scenario, killing Heart Shooter does save Gunshot
Victim's life, but Shooter's death is itself a waste. Assuming that
Shooter, by threatening Gunshot Victim's life, did not forever forfeit
her interest in living (an assumption that is implicit in the legal
prohibition against killing her that returns after she has been disarmed),
it would have been better if Shooter did not actually die from Child's
attack, as long as she was successfully disabled from killing Gunshot
Victim. Though Child intends to kill Shooter on the subway platform
(in the attempted assassin scenario), in other words, the objective of the
killing is to prevent Shooter from herself killing Gunshot Victim. If this
end were served and the killing of Shooter somehow averted as well,
that would be the better outcome.
In the heart donor scenario, by contrast, Shooter's death is not a
waste, because her heart-which cannot be transplanted without killing
her-provides Gunshot Victim with a second chance at life. Shooter's
death is, accordingly, not in vain and is a necessary component of
accomplishing the objective that Child seeks in killing Shooter. Why
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should that fact itself make Child's killing of Shooter somehow worse
than it would have been on the subway platform?
One answer is what we might call an "acoustic separation"' 07 that
we properly erect between our assessments, respectively, of wrongful,
threatening actions (such as Heart Shooter's on the subway platform)
and later consequences that follow from such actions (such as Gunshot
Victim's need for a heart). One can justifiably respond to-and
defuse-a threat by killing or torturing the source of that threat, so long
as the killing or torture is itself expected to defuse the threat by
disabling its source. Things change, however, once the threat created
by the source has acquired a life of its own, such that killing or torturing
the source (and thus disabling him) cannot-in and of itself-defuse the
threat. At that point, the act of killing or torturing the source becomes a
means of harvesting human "parts" (whether they be actual parts, such
as organs, or information) rather than of disabling an aggressor.
Why does the distinction-between a target's threatening actions
and the later (but also threatening) ramifications of those actions-
matter to our intuitions about when violence is or is not justifiable? I
suggest that it is because in addressing the latter ramifications (whether
they consist of the need for a heart or the need for information), the
source's utility as a resource is now only contingently linked with the
source's wrongdoing, i.e., his having generated the threat in the first
place.
For a concrete illustration, imagine that Child, instead of killing
Shooter, had killed a passing nurse or another (heart-healthy) patient at
the hospital to obtain a heart for Gunshot Victim. This action would
have served the objective of saving Child's father's life (by providing a
donor heart) just as well as killing Shooter did. Child apparently
selected her target because of Shooter's direct responsibility for
Gunshot Victim's dire circumstances-Shooter's status as a
wrongdoer-but the target's utility as a heart donor does not turn at all
on this status. Shooter's having been the one to deprive Gunshot Victim
of a usable heart does not contribute in any way to her qualification as a
donor. The relationship between wrongdoing and utility in Shooter's
case is accordingly contingent-dependent on the particular facts
here-rather than analytic-logically necessary by virtue of the fact that
disabling anyone other than the source of a threat will do nothing to
defuse the threat.
To further appreciate the significance of this contingent
107 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1984) (developing the concept of an acoustic separation between
primary rules governing private parties-indicating what they should and should not be doing-
and regulations on government officials-which direct the methods by which such officials may
attempt to bring about private compliance with the primary rules).
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relationship between wrongdoing and utility, consider an example from
the canon of moral dilemmas: the lifeboat. 108 Several people occupy a
lifeboat which lacks sufficient food to enable anyone to survive long
enough to reach shore. If all of the occupants of the lifeboat refrain
from violence, then all will almost certainly die. If, on the other hand,
the members of the crew set upon one of their number and kill and
devour him, then all but that one victim will likely survive. From an act
utilitarian perspective, the case is a slam dunk-the group should kill
and eat one person to save the others rather than allowing everyone to
die.109
Many will have the intuition that it is morally wrong (though
perhaps understandable and even excusable) to kill and use a fellow
human being for his meat'10 when that human being's existence does
not threaten that of any other occupant of the lifeboat. This counter-
utilitarian intuition, moreover, does not entirely disappear even if we
posit that the selected meat source happens also to have created the dire
circumstances in the first place, perhaps by throwing a box of food and
water into the sea at the beginning of the journey to make space for
himself on the lifeboat.
In the case of true self-defense, the target of deadly force or torture
himself necessarily occupies two roles: he is the person who poses the
threat, and he is the person whose death or suffering of torture is an
effective means of dissipating that threat. In the lifeboat scenario (the
one in which the meat source created the problem by throwing food and
water overboard) and in the Heart Shooter heart-donor scenario, by
contrast, it is only a coincidence or, as here, a choice-by the hungry
crew members or by Child Of Victim, respectively-that unites in one
person the creator of the circumstances that threaten life and the useful
means of exiting those circumstances. One could be entirely innocent,
in other words, and serve the needs of the dying Gunshot Victim or the
dying life-boat crew equally well. Heart Shooter and the meat source
just happen to be both wrongdoers and useful at the same time.
The analogy to interrogational torture is probably, by now,
apparent. The person to be tortured may or may not have created the
circumstances under which the intentional infliction of severe pain is
necessary to the successful extraction of life-saving information. Like
Explosive Sender, the torture target might have set the "ticking bomb"
in a crowded building. Like Bomb Admirer, he might instead be a
108 See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley and Stevens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.
109 For discussion of these and related problems, see SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 71
(1998); RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RGHTS 76 (1992).
110 Note that to a growing number of people, it also seems wrong to do this to any sentient
animal, particularly because we are not on a lifeboat and can survive and even thrive without
consuming our fellow animals. See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL
RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? (2000).
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bystander who believes in Sender's agenda but who came into the
information innocently and without having participated in the plot. Or,
like Intruding Strangler's 15-year-old son, Son Of Strangler (tortured to
pressure Strangler to stop killing Suburban Prey), the torture target
might be entirely innocent-ignorant of the life-saving information at
issue but nonetheless useful, like a passing nurse or other patient at
Gunshot Victim's hospital.
The efficacy of torture in saving lives in the ticking bomb scenario
does not turn on which of these three people is the target. In that sense,
utility is divorced from wrongdoing. Unlike in the case of self-defense,
then, the willingness to kill or cause severe pain to one person (through
interrogational torture or extracting a heart) in order to save the lives of
other people is, at a fundamental level, unmoored from a wrongdoing-
dependent, deontological approach to justifiable violence.
Indeed, those among deontologists who allow for the existence of
circumstances under which torture is permissible recognize the
utilitarian foundation of interrogational torture. Michael Moore, for
example, has defended the use of interrogational torture in the "ticking
bomb" scenario on the ground that the scenario crosses a catastrophic-
consequences threshold. He also embraces an equivalence between
people like Explosive Sender (who set the ticking bombs of the world)
and people like Bomb Admirer (who simply refuse to disclose the
locations of those ticking bombs), because revealing the information
that would save lives is so easy that a refusal to disclose is tantamount
to murder. 1
We have already examined a response to this suggestion.1 2 Such a
proposed equivalence is radically at odds with our current legal system
and, to a great extent, with people's moral intuitions. It is nonetheless
tempting to equate these two sorts of people (Explosive Sender and
Bomb Admirer) because the respective utility of torturing each of them
is exactly the same. That is, we need to torture Bomb Admirer as much
as we need to torture Explosive Sender. Accordingly, if the ability to
justify the use of whichever one of them happens to land in our custody
depends upon a finding that they are equally engaged in wrongdoing,
then we are motivated to find that they are indeed thus equally engaged.
And Moore, understandably, does just that.
Consider, however, what would happen if the two men were on
trial for homicide after the ticking bomb had exploded and killed scores
of people. It is unlikely that we would have the law treat them as equal
in guilt. By hypothesis, neither one told the authorities how to prevent
the explosion of Dynamite Holder in the crowded building. But
Explosive Sender-unlike Bomb Admirer-actually set the lethal
111 See Moore, supra note 27, at 325.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 92-100.
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events in motion and therefore bears a far greater responsibility for what
occurred than his friend Admirer does.
Once we have loosened our wrongdoing precondition for
defensible killing or torture, moreover, the use of an innocent child (like
Son Of Strangler) to motivate the killer might also come to seem
acceptable. After all, such torture is just as useful in the saving of
human life as the torture of the bomb-setter and of the knowledgeable
bystander, and we will have already compromised on the wrongdoing
condition in the latter case. Once we allow the link between
wrongdoing and utility to be contingent, the slide to pure utility is
difficult to resist.
It is therefore not that surprising that, having allowed the Bad
Samaritan bystander, Bomb Admirer, to satisfy the wrongdoing
condition, Moore goes on to say that he does consider morally proper
the torture of an innocent person if such torture is truly the only
available way to avert a huge catastrophe. 13 He would not, however,
want this particular allowance codified into the law.' 14 This is perhaps
in part because even though such torture might be justifiable (assuming
that consequences, above some catastrophic threshold, could be
dispositive), the torture of an uncontroversially innocent person remains
morally repugnant and could convey the wrong message about what is
and what is not acceptable in the service of saving lives. Moore appears
to believe that torturing an innocent person, to draw on Michael
Walzer's argument in his famous 1973 essay, dirties ones hands even
when duty might obligate one to do so.115
Notice, moreover, that whether it is a deontologist like Moore or a
utilitarian like Bagaric or Clarke, 116 theorists generally argue that to
justify interrogational torture, there ought to be a large number of
people whose lives hang in the balance. 17 It is interesting as well that a
113 Moore, supra note 27, at 330 ("To justify torturing one innocent person requires that there
be horrendous consequences attached to not torturing that person-the destruction of an entire
city, or, perhaps, of a lifeboat or building full of people.").
114 Id. at 331 ("That this is a psychological danger [the slippery slope from torturing an
innocent person to avert catastrophe to torturing an innocent person whenever the beneficial
consequences outweigh the harm] is a reason not to tell people that there are thresholds of
awfulness that justify prima facie immoral behavior. It is not a reason to doubt that there are such
moral thresholds for consequential calculation."). Moore therefore concludes that "Israeli Law
should contain a flat ban on torture of innocents." Id. at 341.
115 See Walzer, supra note 3.
116 Bagaric & Clarke I, supra note 17; Bagaric & Clarke II, supra note 17.
117 Bagaric & Clarke I, supra note 17, at 611 ("The key consideration regarding the
permissibility of torture is the magnitude of harm that is sought to be prevented. To this end, the
appropriate measure is the number of lives that are likely to be lost if the threatened harm is not
alleviated."); Bagaric & Clarke II, supra note 17, at 714 ("In assessing the potential
dehumanizing aspect of a proposal .... [a]ll affected parties must be given equal consideration.
Sure speculative consequences (in this case the likelihood that the attack will be actually averted)
weigh less than certain consequences (the pain inflicted on the suspect), but at some point the
1456 [Vol. 30:4
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1456 2008-2009
2009] WHY TORTURE IS DIFFERENT 1457
utilitarian would remain at least somewhat wedded to the wrongdoing
of the target, 118 though this precondition to torture is associated with a
deontological approach. Note that both sorts of anti-absolutist theorists
agree that if a large number of people can be rescued through the torture
of one guilty person, then such torture is acceptable.'1 19
If we are truly dealing with the moral equivalent of self-defense,
however, then there should be no need to insist on large numbers.
Neither the law of self-defense nor philosophical expositions of the
scope of the self-defense justification require us to count how many
lives can be saved by killing an aggressor who threatens a person's
life. 120 That every one of us can kill someone who is attempting to kill
us-at least in the absence of safe alternatives121-is a foundational
individual right, and it accordingly belongs to every individual, not
merely to groups of people. Indeed, many would agree that even if
saving oneself required the killing of many aggressors, such a killing
would be justifiable self-defense, notwithstanding the fact that, on the
numbers, surrender to murder would result in a lesser net loss of life. 22
In the case of interrogational torture, however, matters are
different, even for those who muster arguments on its behalf. On the
law, it appears, the only potential defense to such conduct is the
"necessity" defense, 123 and this defense is entirely one about
speculative side of the scales (where, for example, there are a large number of lives at stake) are
so heavy that they outweigh certain negative consequences."); Moore, supra note 27, at 328 ("It
just isn't true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent
person. It isn't even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist
nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person.").
118 Bagaric & Clarke I, supra note 17, at 612 ("As a general rule torture should normally be
confined to people that are responsible in some way for the threatened harm.").
119 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 27, at 333 ("[T]he moral ban against torture applies less
firmly to those who culpably cause the need for torture by planting the bomb that needs removal,
etc.; such persons may be tortured when absolutely necessary to remove the threat that they have
caused."); Bagaric & Clarke I, supra note 17, at 612 ("As a general rule torture should normally
be confined to people that are responsible in some way for the threatened harm.").
120 See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Defense of Others and Defenseless "Others ", 17 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 327, 358 ("[Slelf-defense has been deemed justifiable even where there is more than
one attacker, and the threatened individual kills them all."); Wasserman, supra note 62, at 359
("[A] single victim is permitted to kill any number of intentional aggressors if it is necessary for
his survival."). One real-world example of a defendant who asserted (and prevailed at his trial
on) a claim of right to shoot at multiple assailants in self-defense was the case of Bernhard Goetz.
On the question whether he was indeed acting in self-defense, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A
CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988).
121 Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2)(ii) (West 2008) (requiring retreat, if safe,
as a pre-condition to lethal self-defense) with ALA. CODE 13A-3-23(b) (2008) (rejecting a duty to
retreat in favor of the right to stand one's ground) and FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2007) (same).
122 See Jeremy Waldron, Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 711, 746 (2000) (explaining that self-defense "applies irrespective of the number of
assailants") (discussing Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the
Criminal Law, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 109, 117-19
(1987)).
123 See Committee against Torture v. Israel, supra note 73, at 178 (explaining that although a
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consequences: we do what we have to do to avert a greater harm. 124 For
Moore, a deontologist, one must face a catastrophic threat before one
has passed the threshold at which consequences trump principle. 125 And
when the consequences are grave enough, even the torture of an
innocent may be justifiable. 126
Others, too, invoke catastrophic threats and suggest that torture
might be or is justified then and only then.' 27 One has the distinct
impression, however, that perhaps one is not truly "justifying" torture of
the innocent so much as predicting that it would take place 28 or
demonstrating an understanding of (and perhaps relief in) the generally
reluctant torturer's decision to set aside his scruples long enough to
prevent the "heavens" from falling.129
E. Reducing the Stakes for the Target
We have seen that when the proposed life-saving intervention is to
inflict extreme violence on a target, as in the case of Heart Shooter and
Gunshot Victim, our intuitions demand a tight, nearly-analytic link
between the target's wrongdoing and the utility of his death in saving
criminal defendant might be able to avail herself of a necessity defense, the question before the
Court was whether one could thereby infer advance authority for physical interrogation, a
question which the Court answered no); Gross, supra note 26, at 240-41 ("[T]hrough a
mechanism of extralegal action I would term official disobedience: in circumstances amounting to
a catastrophic case, the appropriate method of tackling extremely grave national dangers and
threats may entail going outside the legal order .... Those officials must assume the risks
involved in acting extralegally."); Kreimer, supra note 75, at 324-25 (contending that although a
ticking bomb scenario might lead reasonable minds to differ on the permissibility of torture, "on
the question of whether scholars or courts should announce before the fact that the Constitution
permits torture, the answer seems clearer: ours is not a Constitution that condones such actions.").
124 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (2008) ("Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to
avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil
sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense charged .. "); see also George C. Christie, The Defense of Legal Necessity
Considered from the Legal and Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975 (1999).
125 Moore, supra note 27, at 330. ("A consequentialist is committed by her moral theory to
saying that torture of one person is justified whenever it is necessary to prevent the torture of two
or more. The agent-relative view, even as here modified, is not committed to this proposition.
To justify torturing one innocent person requires that there be horrendous consequences attached
to not torturing that person-the destruction of an entire city, or, perhaps, of a lifeboat or building
full of people.").
126 Id.
127 See Bagaric & Clarke I, supra note 17, at 611 ("Lesser [than death] forms of threatened
harm will not justify torture."); Miriam Gur-Arye, supra note 94, at 195 ("The use of force in
interrogation... may only be justified in limited cases of an imminent threat of a concrete
terrorist attack-ticking bomb situations in its narrow sense.").
128 See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 266. (observing that virtually everyone in his audiences
respond affirmatively to the question: "How many of you think that nonlethal torture would be
used if we were ever confronted with a ticking time bomb terrorist case?").
129 See Dorfinan, supra note 19, at 15.
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someone's life. This demand helps account for the otherwise odd
requirement, typically articulated by those who defend torture in limited
circumstances, that there be a catastrophic threat in place (rather than a
threat to one life) before torture becomes permissible: unlike in self-
defense killing, the looser link between wrongdoing and utility must be
made up for in the amount of utility. We turn now to the question
whether reducing the stakes for the target (from death to something less
intrusive) might alter the demand for such a close tie between
wrongdoing and utility.
To explore the effect of reducing the proposed harm to the target,
consider a variation on the first Heart Shooter/Gunshot Victim
hypothetical case. Imagine that instead of heart failure, Gunshot Victim
suffers kidney failure as a direct result of Shooter's actions on the
subway platform. Gunshot Victim needs a new kidney in order to
survive, and none will be available within the necessary time
window. 30 This time, Child Of Victim kidnaps Heart Shooter and
questions her (without torture, for our purposes), learning from her
answers that a kidney from Shooter would be compatible with Gunshot
Victim's blood and tissue types. At that point, Child forges a donation
"consent" letter and drugs Shooter, who promptly becomes
unconscious. Child brings Shooter to the hospital and, as in the heart
donation scenario, is able to assemble a surgical team that, ignorant of
the circumstances, transplants one of Shooter's kidneys into Gunshot
Victim, who survives as a result.
Once again, most of us would likely have the intuition that what
Child did was wrong (though, again, perhaps understandable). She
cannot farm Shooter for an organ, notwithstanding the fact that Shooter
engaged in wrongdoing by having directly created the circumstances
under which Gunshot Victim needs the organ transplant and
notwithstanding the fact that from a utilitarian perspective, the
transplant is desirable: Shooter will survive (albeit with some health
risks that she would not otherwise have assumed), and Gunshot Victim
will survive, which he otherwise could not have done. In spite of the
coincidental alignment of wrongdoing and utility-of-target-in addition
to the maximization of human survival-extracting a kidney from an
unwilling donor seems to many of us far too extreme an imposition to
be justifiable.
Now vary the scenario once again. Imagine that Shooter is
traveling in an ambulance with Gunshot Victim, because there were not
enough personnel at the scene of the shooting to bring Shooter to jail
and Gunshot Victim to the hospital separately. The ambulance is stuck
in gridlock traffic and will not be able to reach any hospital in time to
130 Assume, for purposes of this case, that dialysis is not an option.
2009] 1459
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1459 2008-2009
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
prevent Gunshot Victim from dying of the blood loss he has already
sustained. Supplies in the ambulance have run out. The paramedic
yells out the door asking if anyone in the traffic jam would be willing to
donate blood, but no one responds affirmatively to the plea.
Gunshot Victim has not lost any vital organs, but he needs blood
immediately. The paramedic cannot provide his own blood, because he
is anemic and would lose consciousness (and thus become unable to
transfuse the blood) if he were to donate more than a trivial amount.
The paramedic asks Shooter if she would be willing to donate, and
she responds, "Absolutely not. I could certainly spare the blood-I
have successfully donated blood on many occasions and was about to
donate again tomorrow. However, Gunshot Victim deserves to die. He
is evil for firing me without a good reason."
Despite Shooter's protests, the paramedic manages to restrain
Shooter, who is already in handcuffs and leg irons, and proceeds to take
a pint of blood from her for immediate transfusion into Gunshot Victim.
Traffic eventually clears, and as a result of the transfusion, Gunshot
Victim survives the trip to the hospital, where he receives more blood
from available supplies.
Did the paramedic do anything wrong? This fact pattern presents a
harder case than the kidney (or heart) donation scenarios. We know
from what Shooter said that she will not suffer any substantial harm
from losing some blood and will therefore not experience anything like
the sort of loss that accompanies the donation of a heart or even a
kidney. She is, in addition, a wrongdoer for having made Gunshot
Victim lose so much blood that he must receive an immediate
transfusion or die. Her reason for refusing is wrongful as well-she
refuses because she wants him to die of her having shot him. Though
we might feel uncomfortable about allowing the paramedic to take
Shooter's blood against her will, it is not obviously the wrong thing to
do.
What distinguishes the taking of blood from the removal of an
organ? It is the relatively innocuous nature of the intrusion on the
target. In a different context, the Supreme Court examined the
significance of a blood draw in Schmerber v. California.131 The Court
there held that taking blood from a non-consenting drunk-driving
suspect on the basis of probable cause violates neither the Fifth
Amendment (because bleeding is not "bearing witness") 132 nor the
131 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (finding reasonable the taking of
blood from a DUI suspect).
132 Id. at 765 ("Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of
compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act
or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.").
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Fourth Amendment (because it is a "reasonable" search). 133  One
component of the Court's analysis relied on the recognition that taking
blood from a person is a relatively routine and low-risk procedure. 134 It
accordingly does not violate any fundamental right and is
constitutionally proper, provided there is good reason to think the blood
will provide evidence against the suspect.
This ruling, to the extent that one finds it persuasive, has
application to the Heart Shooter/Gunshot Victim story. Here too, the
taking of Shooter's blood will not cause her serious injury or lasting
physical harm, and the pain associated with the insertion of a needle is
minimal. Though the quantity of blood is greater in our donation case
than in a blood/alcohol content test case, we know from Shooter that she
was prepared to donate the next day and therefore assesses the risk to
herself from donation to be acceptable, an assessment shared by the
medical community with respect to most potential donors. And
significantly, in both Schmerber and our scenario, the authorities are
taking blood from a particular person because that person combines
suspected wrongdoing with utility: taking blood from him or her targets
the suspected wrongdoer and simultaneously assists, alternately, in the
prosecution of a man for drunk driving or in the saving of a man from
bleeding to death. The reduced harm to be inflicted, then, renders more
acceptable than otherwise our reliance on a looser and contingent
(though, importantly, extant) wrongdoing-utility connection.
F. The Wrongdoing/Utility Link and the Question of Interrogational
Torture
The foregoing examples, I believe, show that what distinguishes
the heart donation scenario involving Heart Shooter and Gunshot
Victim from true self-defense is the accidental or contingent connection
between wrongdoing and utility. This differs from the scenario
involving Heart Shooter the attempted assassin on the subway
platform-where Child of Victim kills Shooter to disable her from
shooting Gunshot Victim. In the case of Shooter the organ donor, Child
could obtain a useful heart from a different (unwilling) donor. There is
nothing special about Shooter that makes her uniquely useful as a
donor, in other words. Her wrongdoing simply makes her a morally
appealing target because she happens to have given rise to the
circumstances necessitating a donation in the first place.
133 Id. at 771 ("[T]he test chosen to measure petitioner's blood-alcohol level was a reasonable
one.").
134 Id. ("Such tests are a commonplace... and... for most people the procedure involves
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.").
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After all of this discussion, of course, one might still believe that
interrogational torture is, in some circumstances, justifiable, like self-
defense, even if farming organs from Shooter to save Gunshot Victim
never is. What might account for this intuition?
One difference between interrogational torture and the farming of
Shooter's heart is that in the "ticking bomb" situation, the reason that
the particular target is the one selected for torture-the information he
holds-is logically connected to (though it does not require) his having
played a role in setting the bomb in the first place. That is, the
putatively justified torturer selects his particular target because, for the
most part, only someone who can reveal information about the bomb
plot will be of any use in defusing the bomb. Someone who does have
information to reveal, in turn, is likely to have participated in some way
in the setting of the bomb, particularly if he would resist demands by
law enforcement that he provide the information that he knows, as
Explosive Sender would.
In the heart and kidney donation scenarios, by contrast, what
makes Shooter useful to the project of saving Gunshot Victim's life has
nothing to do with her having shot him. From the point of view of
utility, there is no reason at all to prefer a "guilty" organ donor to an
"innocent" organ donor. It is likely, of course, that Child Of Victim in
fact selected Heart Shooter because she is the wrongdoer, but her
identity as the wrongdoer does nothing to enhance her utility. To put
the matter differently, when we look for ideal organ donors, we have no
health-related reasons for focusing our attention on the population of
wrongdoers.
The interrogational torture target's wrongdoing, by contrast, is
closely intertwined with his utility. Though Gunshot Victim needs a
heart to survive, the use of Heart Shooter in particular for her heart is
not necessary or even preferable, because many other people's hearts
would be just as useful as Shooter's. To save the terrorist's intended
group of victims, however, the torture of the particular terrorist would
be optimal. Substituting a random innocent person for the terrorist
would render the torture entirely useless. Though not quite analytic,
then (because non-participants like Bomb Admirer, for example, could,
in theory, possess the requisite knowledge), the connection between
wrongdoing and utility is generally far tighter in the case of
interrogational torture than in our case of involuntary organ donation.
In the latter circumstance, the connection is entirely contingent on
Child's decision to select Shooter as the donor. It is, I propose, that
distinction-between the relative tightness in each case of the link (or
fit) between a target's wrongdoing and the utility of harming him-that
makes people feel less convinced of the wrongfulness of interrogational
torture in the ticking bomb scenario than they are of the wrongfulness of
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taking Shooter's heart in the Shooter-the-heart-donor scenario.
III. THE TRULY DEFENSELESS TARGET
The discussion thus far has shown why interrogational torture
could be thought justified by some while simultaneously considered
unjustified by others in the ticking bomb case. The examples I have
explored here operate on the assumption that our hypothetical captive
whose torture could save lives truly holds the information that his
captors demand. On this assumption, the captive to be tortured is
capable of avoiding the deliberate infliction of severe pain on his person
by revealing what he knows to save the lives in danger. But what if, in
reality, he is not capable of doing so? The legitimacy of authorizing the
use of extreme force-whether deadly force or torture-must depend
on, among other things, how certain we can be that the justifying
conditions obtain. In the case of interrogational torture, as Seth Kreimer
poignantly suggests, the endpoint will likely turn on the interrogator's
appetite for torture rather than on any specific revelation that might self-
evidently close the matter between interrogator and captive. 35 Unlike a
"reasonable search" for a material item, Kreimer explains, a torturer
generally cannot know-without continuing to torture his subject
relentlessly-whether perhaps there is something crucial that the subject
has yet to disclose.
Put another way, the use of torture to extract information is an
inexact enterprise, even when it "works" in the sense of motivating
people to reveal what they know. The torturer cannot determine
immediately upon hearing a disclosure from the captive whether the
disclosure (a) is accurate, (b) provides sufficient information to save the
threatened lives, or (c) represents the entirety of life-saving information
known by the captive. To surrender in wartime generally requires only
a simple gesture, such as the waving of a white flag. In this sense,
surrender in war resembles surrender in a self-defense scenario: when
the killer, Intruding Strangler, lets go of the homeowner, Suburban
Prey, Prey stops biting Strangler. Surrender in an interrogation room,
however, is a far more complicated proposition.
The distinction between killing or torturing people in self-defense
(or even shooting them in battle), on the one hand, and torturing them
for information, on the other, may accordingly be great, in practice. A
given captured terrorist may be linked to any of a number of violent
plots, and the torturer-to find out anything useful-will have to inflict
135 Kreimer, supra note 75, at 307 ("[T]he pain and degradation that may be said to be
,necessary' is limited only by the will of the torturer and the resistance of the tortured.").
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pain even after she has learned everything useful that the captive knows,
if only to ensure that this is the case.
Rather than killing a person who is attacking an innocent victim,
then, the torture that is likely to take place-even with the best of
intentions-will be less like self-defense and more like the killing of
random, potentially violent people in the hopes that one of them will
thereby be foiled in his plan to commit a murder. If killing or causing
pain to the defenseless is impermissible, then torture under these
circumstances must be as well. The next Part will examine a familiar
case that helps dramatize the consequences of using extreme force in the
circumstances of uncertainty that must regularly confront interrogators.
A. The Wages of Uncertainty: Amadou Diallo, Self-Defense, and
Interrogational Torture
In February 1999, four police officers encountered Amadou Diallo,
a young, unarmed West African immigrant, and riddled him with forty-
one bullets, just outside of his Bronx apartment house. For many
Americans, Diallo's death came to symbolize and signify the racism of
police officers in New York City and their astonishing willingness to
unleash deadly force against a black man who posed no threat to
anyone. Others viewed this first reaction to the Diallo shooting as
overblown and unfair to the officers, who had reasonably believed that
Diallo was reaching for a gun at the time that they shot him. Malcolm
Gladwell provides an alternative account of the shooting that rejects
both the "police are racists" and the "police acted properly" versions of
what took place. 136
Gladwell explains that when a human being finds herself in a
highly stressful and demanding set of circumstances, it is natural and
useful for her to absorb salient facts and to draw quick conclusions on
the basis of those facts. When a person is familiar with a given setting,
she is often able to absorb the most important information around her
quickly and efficiently and draw highly accurate conclusions without
engaging in much conscious deliberation. Gladwell provides the
example of a police officer confronting an armed teenager. 137 An
officer with a wealth of experience may be able to determine with a
high degree of confidence whether or not a particular youth will actually
shoot at him and thereby make the correct life-or-death judgment in the
situation about whether or not to hold his fire.
As Gladwell points out, however, the officers who confronted
136 See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 189-97 (2005).
137 Id. at 239-41.
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Amadou Diallo had not accumulated very much experience of the
relevant neighborhood or the community living in that neighborhood.138
The police accordingly lacked the ability to read the situation that they
faced with speed and accuracy.' 39  Significantly, for example, it
apparently did not occur to the officers that the person they were
confronting might not understand English (and therefore be unable to
follow their order that he put his hands in the air).140 From there
followed a series of errors-believing that Diallo was reaching for a gun
when he reached for his wallet, and believing that one of the officers
had fallen in response to a shot from Diallo's gun-that ultimately led
to Diallo's death.
These events were tragic, though they probably resulted from
mistakes rather than a concerted effort to execute an unarmed black
man. Nonetheless, the mistakes were not inevitable. They were the
sorts of mistakes that more experienced officers, familiar with their
surroundings, might not have made. The officers in question, in other
words, should not have been in a position to make the choices that they
made.
In addition to offering a cautionary tale about policing in New
York City, the story of Amadou Diallo has something to teach us about
the torture question. Police (and private individuals) are ordinarily
vested with the right to kill in self-defense (or the defense of others).
This right represents a rare moral consensus and thereby provides a
foundation for accepting or rejecting other proposed rights, depending
on how closely they resemble self-defense. We have been engaging in
precisely this sort of analysis of interrogational torture in this Article.
One might believe that interrogational torture is sometimes very
much like killing (or torture) in self-defense, as Michael Moore has
proposed. 141 Nonetheless, one can readily understand that unlike classic
self-defense situations-where the threat is clear and the defensive
response plainly necessary-interrogational torture-even if it is close
to a form of self-defense-is far more likely to occur in the sort of fog
that clouded the officers' judgment in the Amadou Diallo case. The
officers-based on their own beliefs, based-in turn--on their own
experiences in the field-may have acted subjectively in self-defense;
yet their actions, on the account above, were nonetheless, foreseeably
138 Id. at 242-43.
139 Id. at 214 ("We make these kinds of complicated, lightning-fast calculations very well....
And this is the puzzle of the Amadou Diallo case, because in the early hours of February 4, 1999,
Sean Carroll and his fellow officers for some reason could not do this at all.").
140 See NYC Police Officers Acquitted in Diallo Shooting, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG.,
Feb. 25, 2000, at 126A2 ("Carroll [the officer who first spotted Diallo] also acknowledged that he
never considered that Diallo did not respond to the officers' commands because he did not
understand English.").
141 See Moore, supra note 27, at 320-25.
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and unreasonably, in error.
The cultural barrier between the shooting officers and their target,
Diallo, can accordingly help elucidate the informational fog in which
interrogators holding a potential terrorist who might possess life-saving
information must operate. Like the officers in the Diallo shooting,
interrogators holding a captive and intending to torture him might
believe that people will die if they do not engage in torture (and that
those same people will live if they do engage in torture). But like the
Diallo shooters, these interrogators could be running an unacceptably
high risk that they are wrong. 42
If we assume that the interrogators are correct, of course, then their
actions may be justified on one of the theories that we have explored. 143
The chances are great, however, that they are mistaken about their
captive (e.g., he lacks current and accurate information that would help
the interrogators avert a correctly-anticipated catastrophe or there is no
catastrophe to avert, in the given case). If they are mistaken, as they-
like police officers roving around a neighborhood they do not
understand-are likely regularly to be, then their torture of the suspect
will produce unwarranted, unnecessary, and undeserved suffering that
benefits no one. By the time interrogators realize that there is nothing
to be gained, moreover, like the Diallo shooters, they might well have
done irreparable harm, producing behavior that appears to confirm
142 One might think that self-defense situations (and armed conflict more generally) involve
greater uncertainty than terrorism interrogation and that therefore, interrogators contemplating
torture should have at least as much leeway as private parties and police officers contemplating
lethal self-defense or defense of others. If so, interrogational torture of terrorism suspects could
be approached under rules like those governing soldiers involved in armed conflict and faced, in
their choices, with a substantial chance of killing innocent civilians. In my view, however, this
analogy runs in the wrong direction. The law of war governing "collateral damage" has
devastating consequences for innocent civilians and for the combatants themselves. See
THEODORE NADELSON, TRAINED TO KILL: SOLDIERS AT WAR (2005) (describing the continuing
attraction experienced by veterans-even those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder-for
the danger and violence of combat and killing). Moreover, even taking the law of war as given, it
should not serve as a template for torture. The very existence of rules governing armed conflict
makes evident the assumption that enemy troops pose a lethal threat, in circumstances in which
no such assumption could be made confidently in civilian life. There seems room to disagree, but
I suspect that the ticking bomb scenario (where there is anything approaching certainty about the
various necessary conditions) is quite rare. The ticking bomb poses uncertainty along the same
dimension one confronts in the case of self-defense (how likely is it that this person was involved
in planting the bomb?) and uncertainty along other dimensions as well (Do I have an involved
person? Does the person know anything about how to stop the bomb? Will torture make him
give me information he believes to be accurate? Will the information continue to be accurate by
the time I obtain it? Can I obtain the information through less extreme means?). In the case of
self-defense, the primary uncertainty concerns the intention and capacity of the perceived
assailant-if one is right about the assailant's imminent intentions, then it will ordinarily follow
that disabling him is both necessary and effective.
143 See supra pp. 1444-46, 1450-53 (discussing, respectively, the delegated threat theory and
consideration of the similarities and differences between interrogational torture and the heart
donor scenario).
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rather than negate their suspicions-perhaps a false confession, for
example, intended to stop the pain.
The uncertainties that necessarily surround the calculations of an
interrogator who tortures a captive make outcomes like Amadou
Diallo's death the likely rule rather than the exception. And if we know
in advance that such encounters will most often be as destructive and
fruitless as the police encounter with the innocent Amadou Diallo was,
it may be our duty to avoid the encounters altogether. Interrogational
torture, on this approach, is potentially justifiable under a very limited
set of circumstances, but the odds that an interrogator will-like
Diallo's shooters-see those circumstances everywhere, to devastating
effect, might make the most practical approach to torture the same as
that embraced by absolutists who see no analogy between self-defense
and interrogational torture: never do it, ever.
IV. THE UTILITY OF THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS RECONSIDERED
As we have noted, the ticking bomb scenario is stylized. In reality,
we tend not to have complete information, and what is theoretically
justifiable may therefore-as a practical matter-never or virtually
never be actually defensible. The various cases I have invented in these
pages are stylized as well. We are unlikely to encounter in real life the
simplicity of the scenarios involving Heart Shooter, Gunshot Victim,
and Child Of Victim. Is it therefore inappropriate to consider such
questions? Is there something deeply corrupting about entertaining
these hypothetical examples?
Some opponents of all torture consider it wrong even to
contemplate the ticking bomb scenario. It is seductive, they claim, and
replaces reality with a fantasy-based presumption that torture is
acceptable. 144 In analyzing this argument, I next consider the literary
example of Sophie's Choice for the light it sheds on tragic choices.145 I
conclude that thinking about such choices is not inherently corrupt. In
doing so, I endorse Michael Walzer's approach to the tragic choice
144 See Stephen Holmes, Is Defiance of Law a Proof of Success? Magical Thinking in the War
on Terror, in TORTURE DEBATE, supra note 1, at 118, 128 ("The elusiveness of these criminal
conspirators ... gives rise... to daydreams of superman-style rescues. To set policies on the
basis of such far-fetched [ticking bomb] scenarios would be folly."); Henry Shue, supra note 35,
at 57 ("[T]here is a saying in jurisprudence that hard cases make bad law, and there might well be
one in philosophy that artificial cases make bad ethics."); David Luban, supra note 86, at 36
("I... suggest that ticking bomb stories are built on a set of assumptions that amount to
intellectual fraud .... "); id. at 46 ("The ticking bomb is the picture that bewitches us."); Elaine
Scarry, Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra
note 1, at 283-84 (setting forth a similar argument).
145 See infra Part 1V.A for a discussion of this novel.
2009] 1467
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1467 2008-2009
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
entailed in the ticking bomb scenario. 146
I then conclude, as I began, with the view that an absolute ban on
torture is probably best but with the caveat of commentators like Oren
Gross that the ticking bomb scenario-and the argument justifying
torture in such cases-do not thereby disappear from the moral
universe.
A. Advising Sophie
Some who defend an absolute ban on torture have said that the
"ticking bomb" scenario is a lie.147 The reality of torture is that captors
typically do not know whether there is a ticking-bomb at all or
whether-if there is such a bomb-their captive has any useful
information about it. People are interrogated and tortured to find out
what they know, and there is an operative presumption (by interrogators
willing to engage in torture) that captives as a group are "likely enough"
to know something to justify their torture. Given that this is the reality
of torture "on the ground," discussions of the ticking bomb scenario
seduce us 148 into permitting some torture, after which we're just
"haggling about the price."' 149
At one level, this assessment represents a sort of utilitarian
argument against posing and thinking about the ticking bomb scenario.
That is, there are some questions that should not be asked, because one
has entered a moral danger zone in posing them, a zone from which one
will inevitably exit with moral scars. To examine this idea, consider an
example from literature. In William Styron's Sophie's Choice, a
woman is faced with a Nazi who directs her to choose which one of her
two children will be killed. Sophie initially resists making the choice,
but she is led to believe that if she refuses to choose, then both children
will die. She concludes that she must therefore make a selection,
because that is the only way that she can save either of her children.
146 See Walzer, supra note 3.
147 See Henry Shue, supra note 35, at 57 ("Notice how unlike the circumstances of an actual
choice about torture the philosopher's example is. The proposed victim of our torture is not
someone we suspect .. he is the perpetrator .... he did plant the device.") (emphasis in
original); see also Holmes, supra note 144, at 127-28 ("[T]he idea that the authorities might get a
dangerous terrorist into their custody, after he has planned an attack but before he has executed it,
is a utopian fantasy."); Luban, supra note 86, at 45 ("The ticking time-bomb scenario cheats...
by stipulating that the bomb is there ... and that officials know it and they know they have the
man who planted it.").
148 Luban, supra note 86, at 45.
149 Id. at 44. The quotation is a reference to the (likely apocryphal) story usually attributed to
George Bernard Shaw in which a woman says she might sell her body for a million dollars but is
shocked when asked whether she would sell it for ten. Shaw's response is to note that she's
already proven herself a whore, and they are now only haggling over price.
1468 [Vol. 30:4
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1468 2008-2009
WHY TORTURE IS DIFFERENT
She chooses Jan, her son, for life, and Eva, her daughter, for death. 150
She never learns what ultimately happened to Jan. 15' The evil of what
the Nazi does to Sophie in this story is profound.152
First and most obviously, the Nazi kills one and perhaps two
innocent young children and thereby also causes unfathomable suffering
to their mother. Second, he presents Sophie with her choice, and this
too is a moral outrage (for which the novel is named). In addition to
losing her children, Sophie is forced-by the choice-to decide
between two horrifying options. She can refuse to select one of her
children for death and in so doing, guarantee that both children will die.
That is, her first choice is to become an accomplice, by inaction, in the
death of her babies. She can, instead, in an effort to rescue one of her
children, select one or the other child for murder. Her second choice,
then, is to spare one of her children by becoming a more active
accomplice in the other's death. The third component of the cruelty is
to render her decision to choose-and thereby participate actively in
killing one of her children-potentially futile. There is little consolation
for Sophie: she has surrendered her refusal to participate and, to some
degree, has lost both of her children anyway.
What "should" Sophie have done? In one sense, it is
presumptuous to suppose that we can opine about what one "ought to"
do under such extreme circumstances. Even asking a parent of two
children such a question invites an inquiry that is not only sickening to
contemplate but potentially devastating to the equality of love and care
for each child to which any decent parent aspires. There is no good
advice to be given in advance of such situations. Indeed, Sophie's
predicament is as poignant and heart-wrenching as it is largely because
it was so outrageous to place her in the position of having to consider
whether and how she would make such a choice in the first place.
If one does engage the moral question of what Sophie "should"
have done, however, then the analogue of the anti-interrogational-
torture absolutist position might be, "the right thing is to refuse to
become an accomplice, to refuse to select one of the children for death.
Period."' 53 As we see in the novel, Sophie's choice may not even, in
the end, have saved anyone's life. Becoming complicit in the Nazi's
150 WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE 529 (Vintage Int'l 1992) (1979).
151 Id. at 444-50.
152 Though the Nazi's conduct would surely count as mental torture under the Convention
Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(4)(i-iv) (2009), my focus in this section is not on the Nazi's
unambiguously evil conduct but on Sophie's response to it, Sophie's position is analogous to that
of the interrogator confronting the terrorist who has planted the ticking bomb. Though the
analogy is imperfect, because Sophie's children are utterly innocent, one who categorically
opposes interrogational torture might find the interrogator's predicament similar to Sophie's,
153 In his book, David Daube locates such an approach in Jewish tradition. See DAVID
DAUBE, COLLABORATION WITH TYRANNY IN RABBINIC LAW (1965).
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behavior, like torture, thus may not "work." Anyone with a modicum of
compassion can understand why Sophie does what she does, and no one
can fairly judge her individually for doing so. In crafting policy,
however, the absolutist's line would be "never choose one of the
children, even if that guarantees that they both will die."
At first blush, this "advice" makes considerable sense. One ought
not to participate in the killing of one's children. Sophie initially shrank
from the very prospect of doing so. Furthermore, maybe-as might
have occurred in the story-they will both die anyway and therefore,
the consequences will not have made the choice worthwhile. But does
this represent a fair assessment of the moral merits of making versus
refusing to make a choice?
From Sophie's perspective-given what she knows at the time she
makes her choice-she is asked to decide whether one or both of her
children will die. She cannot know whether her tormentor plans to kill
both children no matter what she says. We accordingly cannot judge
her decision on the basis of information to which she herself has no
access (that the Nazi may have no intention of sparing either child and
is simply tormenting her for his own amusement). As I have explained
in a very different context, we judge a person's conduct from that
person's perspective, informed by what that person knew or should have
known at the time of the conduct.154
Given what Sophie knew when she made her decision, it is not
obvious that she should have remained silent-refrained from
participating-when her silence would, so far as she knew, result in two
deaths rather than one. Though it might have been purer of her to refuse
to engage at all, she was the children's mother, and her moral obligation
was arguably to act in a way that would save as many of them as she
could. If we analogize the scenario to that of a burning building, it is by
no means clear that a mother should remain passive and do nothing if
she has the time and strength to save only one of her two children from
the flames.
If the Nazi had simply killed both of her children without asking
for her input, then Sophie would never have faced the dilemma. Once
confronted with "Sophie's Choice," however, she could not escape the
dilemma by simply pretending that it had not been presented. Once you
have explicitly been given apparent power over life and death-and
apparent power is all that you can know you have, until you attempt to
exercise it-doing nothing is no longer what it once was. And this is
particularly true when you have a relationship, as Sophie did, with the
154 See Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and
Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOzO L. REv. 1663 (2007); Sherry F. Colb,
Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1456 (1996).
1470 [Vol. 30:4
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1470 2008-2009
WHY TORTURE IS DIFFERENT
person over whom such apparent power has been granted.
In considering the choice that faced Sophie, it would therefore
seem most accurate, from a moral standpoint, to say that neither option
was acceptable. Once a person has confronted the choice, as Sophie did
in the novel and as real human beings did during the Holocaust, 155 she is
forever changed no matter what she decides. As Michael Walzer said of
the practitioner of necessary torture in his 1973 essay,156 Sophie will
have unclean hands. The absolutist can say that refraining from
choosing maintains Sophie's purity, but Walzer's analysis exposes the
reality that such a statement is a pretense, as much as it is a pretense to
say that what Sophie actually did choose to do had no destructive moral
implications.
Walzer might say of Sophie what he said of government officials.
An official sometimes faces unacceptable choices, as Sophie does. And
no matter how he decides to act, an official in the ticking bomb scenario
will be left with blood on his hands. It is unavoidable. If he tortures
and saves lives, his hands are dirty, though his choice might have been
the better of the two. But if he does nothing and victims perish, then he
is responsible for their deaths, because it was his duty to take care of
them, just as it was Sophie's duty to care for her children.
For Walzer, the person who rightly occupies the position in which
he has the power to make such decisions should be one who recognizes
these implications, one who feels the immorality of choosing torture in
the same way as a mother like Sophie feels the immorality of choosing
one of her beloved children for death. And as Jean Bethke Elshtain
says, 157 to authorize such torture by guaranteeing a justification defense,
much less to bless it in advance by issuing a torture warrant, is to
dissipate the competing moral intuitions that make the "Sophie's
choice" of torture a tormenting dilemma instead of the blank check that
the Bybee memo 158 seemed deliberately to provide.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have considered why and indeed whether
torture-the deliberate infliction of severe pain and suffering-is
qualitatively "different" from death in the way that the U.S. Supreme
Court claims that the death penalty is "different" from a term of
imprisonment. I have argued that an act of torture is not inherently
155 As a daughter of Holocaust survivors, I know of at least one real-life case of a "Sophie's
Choice," ending in the murder of both children, though I am sure there were many others.
156 See Walzer, supra note 3.
157 See Jean Bethke Elshtain, supra note 58, at 84; see also Sullivan, supra note 19, at 21-22.
158 See Bybee Memo, supra note 29.
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different from or worse than an act of killing, demonstrating through a
hypothetical example that torture and death are equally justifiable when
deployed in true self-defense. I then asked the related question whether
interrogational torture-within the "ticking bomb" situation-is in fact
meaningfully distinct from self-defense, the commonly invoked
justificatory analogue for interrogational torture.
To explore the comparison between lethal or torturous self-
defense, on the one hand, and interrogational torture, on the other, I
presented a series of examples in which a wrongdoer harms or threatens
to harm an innocent party, and that harm can be avoided or reversed by
killing the wrongdoer. I analyzed the examples as revealing three
necessary conditions that must accompany any justifiable act of killing
or torture intended to save lives.
The first necessary condition is the actor's having engaged in
wrongdoing that threatens death or substantial bodily harm. The second
condition is the utility of killing or torturing the actor as a means of
promoting the survival and safety of the actor's innocent victim(s). And
the third is that there must exist a tight nexus between the fulfillment of
the first and the second conditions. It must be the case, in other words,
that the utility of killing or torturing the wrongdoer is in some
fundamental manner linked to that actor's wrongdoing.
I argued that in the case of true self-defense, the link between
wrongdoing and utility is necessarily extremely tight-if an actor is
trying to kill a victim, it is his attempt to kill the victim that makes
killing the actor a successful vehicle for saving the victim. Killing some
innocent third party, by contrast, cannot have the desired effect. In the
case of interrogational torture, however, the nexus between the first two
conditions is substantial but weaker and more contingent than in it is in
the case of self-defense. Though it would likely be true that the person
to be tortured (successfully) for life-saving information about a terrorist
attack is directly implicated in the terrorist plot, it need not be. A
person might, for example, know about the plot without having
participated or in any way assisted in its execution. Or a person might,
alternatively, be utterly ignorant and uninvolved in the plot but be loved
by a knowledgeable or guilty party who would be willing to reveal
information to prevent the death or stop the torture of the ignorant party.
Because interrogational torture could "work" in any one of these
scenarios, it is not as clearly justifiable-even in the scenarios in which
the first two conditions are actually met-as self-defense is. Because
the nexus is strong, however, I conclude that the position that
interrogational torture is justified when the first two conditions are met,
is more defensible than is torture or homicide in the case in which the
first two conditions are linked only by happenstance, as in the
hypothetical "Heart Shooter and Heart Donor" scenario that I described.
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WHY TORTURE IS DIFFERENT
The "ticking bomb" case is therefore as vexing as it is because it is so
close to self-defense yet differs from it enough to generate conflicting
intuitions.
Numerous commentators have suggested that the ticking bomb
scenario poses the wrong question, because in reality, we lack the
information that the ticking bomb scenario presumes. 15 9 In reality, we
ordinarily will not know whether there is a ticking bomb, whether-if
there is a ticking bomb-the captive to be tortured has information
about it, whether-if the answer to each of the first two inquiries is
yes-torturing the captive will enable us to save the threatened lives,
and whether, finally, some less ugly alternative approach might have
been just as (or more) effective at saving the potential victims.
I would frame this point slightly differently. In the age of
terrorism, the ticking bomb scenario will likely confront our leaders on
occasion. There are ongoing plots to send suicide bombers to kill and
maim innocent civilians, and there are people who have information
that-if made known-could permit the frustration of these plots. What
we virtually always lack, however, is the capacity to know that we are
confronting a ticking bomb scenario and to know that torturing person X
will in fact save innocent people.
This uncertainty complicates our choices. However unstable in its
own right, a view about the proper course of action in the ticking bomb
scenario in a world in which we are omniscient of everything except for
the information held by our captive, does not necessarily entail any
particular policy for the actual world in which our ignorance is far
greater. As David Luban points out, for example, 160 Michael Moore
analogized torture to self-defense in his 1989 article in the Israeli Law
Review, 161 and the Bybee memo embraced that analogy as authority for
the proposition that any interrogational torture ordered by the President
would constitute "self-defense." But Moore draws very different
conclusions from his theoretical meditation to the real world. He does
not argue, as the Bybee Memo does, for the express legalization of
torture.
Is torture different from killing? My thought experiments suggest
that in cases in which torture literally amounts to self-defense, it is not
different. By contrast, interrogational torture, even under conditions of
stipulated certainty, is different, but only a little. Life in real time does
not, however, come with stipulations, and thus that small theoretical
difference may prove to be crucially important in practice.
159 See Henry Shue, supra note 35, at 57; see also Luban, supra note 86, at 45.
160 See id. at 63.
161 Moore, supra note 27, at 320-25.
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